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APPENDIX A:  MORE DETAILS ON METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
Sales Taxes and Gross Receipts Taxes 
As mentioned in the text discussion, the sales tax “burden” on business-location decisions 
is NOT what the business pays on its own sales, but rather how much in taxes the firm will pay 
in sales tax on its purchase of business inputs from other businesses. We assume sales tax paid 
by the firm based on its sales within the state is passed on to the buyers and does not burden the 
firm. But the firm is burdened by sales taxes on its business inputs. 
 The business inputs to be considered are the following: 
 The firm’s initial purchase of the building, which is assumed to be newly constructed. 
 The firm’s initial purchase of machinery and equipment. 
 The firm’s annual purchase each year of sufficient building investment and 
machinery and equipment investment to offset the annual depreciation of these items.  
 The firm’s annual purchases each year of intermediate inputs: materials, energy, and 
services.  
 
 Given the structure of the model—a firm locating in a state, then building and equipping 
a new plant from scratch—the potential sales tax burden will be very large the first year, and 
smaller but persistent in subsequent years.  
 We therefore have to determine the sales tax rate that applies in the state each year to the 
following categories: 
 building construction 
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 Materials are assumed to be completely exempt from the sales tax for all industries 
except for construction, where they are assumed to be fully taxable.1 Machinery and equipment 
are always assumed to be completely taxable, unless the state allows for an exemption for 
manufacturing machinery and equipment. We do not consider possible exemptions for non-
manufacturing machinery and equipment.  Energy is treated similarly: we assume it is taxable 
always for nonmanufacturing, and taxable for manufacturing unless it is indicated that it is 
exempt in that state. In addition, in some cases the state indicates that machinery and equipment 
or energy purchases are “partially exempt” for manufacturing, which we treat as meaning 50 
percent exempt and 50 percent taxable.  
 Services used as inputs by businesses are assumed to mostly be nontaxable but to have a 
national average of having 11 percent of their value taxed, based on research by Cline et al. 
(2005). This is assumed to vary proportionally across states according to a Federation of Tax 
Administrators (2007) count of how many services that might be consumed by businesses are 
taxed in each state.2  
 Construction inputs to business are assumed not to be directly taxed. However, we 
assumed that construction contractors pass on, in higher building costs, some of the higher costs 
they face from buying their inputs, such as inputs of energy and services and construction 
materials. We assume that the percentage of construction output that is effectively subject to the 
                                                 
1 Irrational as this might appear, this seems to be consistent with state sales tax laws. See Mikesell (2001, p. 
563): “When contractors purchase materials, these purchases are almost universally taxed under the sales tax. 
Contractors . . . pay tax on materials they purchase, and do not collect tax on their construction contracts. This 
treatment . . . means that business purchases of buildings and other infrastructure . . . will bear an embedded sales 
tax.”  
2 The FTA specifically warns against using the data in this way, on the sensible grounds that this does not 
account for relative purchases of different items or for more details in exactly what is and isn’t taxable. However, all 
we are trying to do here is to at least roughly distinguish between states that tax a lot of business-to-business 
services versus those that don’t. This seems more accurate than assuming uniformity in services taxation across 
states.  
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sales tax burden that accompanies business purchases is equal to the sum of three elements: 1) 
the proportion of construction output that is business purchases of energy, plus 2) raw materials, 
plus 3) the proportion of business services in general taxed in that state. This ends up being a 
percentage ranging from 38 to 41 percent across the states.  In determining the proportion of the 
sales tax paid on building construction, both in the first year and to offset depreciation in later 
years, we multiply the total state and local sales tax rate times this percentage times the firm’s 
assumed purchases of buildings in each year. 
 In calculating the actual sales tax paid, we multiply the combined state and local sales tax 
rate times the firm’s assumed purchases in each year of the five types of inputs—1) building 
construction, 2) machinery and equipment, 3) materials, 4) energy, and 5) services—times the 
proportion of each of those types of inputs that is assumed to be taxable for that state and that 
industry. These calculations of actual taxes paid are used in eventually calculating the present 
value of net state and local taxes paid by each firm. 
In calculating taxable profits, however, we do not treat the firm’s sales tax due on its 
initial building construction and on machinery and equipment as being how taxable profits will 
be calculated. As explained above, we calculate taxable profits each year by instead using the 
depreciation on buildings, and on machinery and equipment, as a measure of the firm’s 
deductible costs for tax purposes of these capital investment items. So for purposes of calculating 
taxable profits, in the initial year only, we substitute for the actual capital investment in buildings 
and machinery and equipment the depreciation of these two items, and then we multiply this by 
the assumed percentage of buildings and machinery and equipment that is assumed to be taxable 
for that industry and state, and then by the combined state and local sales tax rate. As explained 
above, this same calculation is the correct calculation for determining taxable profits each year. 
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But in subsequent years after Year One, this calculation happens to also be correct as a measure 
of actual sales tax paid.  
A few states also have a gross receipts tax, most notably Ohio, Washington, and New 
Mexico. Ohio’s and Washington’s tax stands in for a corporate income tax and is regarded in 
these states as the state’s main business tax. New Mexico’s gross receipts tax is applied in 
addition to a state corporate income tax and seems, within the state, to be regarded more as a 
sales tax.  
 Because these gross receipts taxes only apply to sales within the state, we treat these 
taxes as if they were sales taxes. In other words, we treat their burden on business as not being 
the gross receipts tax that the firm pays on its own receipts, as that is assumed to be passed on to 
buyers. Rather, the business burden is gross receipts tax applied to business purchases of inputs. 
However, because of the way the gross receipts tax is framed—as a tax on the business’s 
gross receipts—it tends to be applied, in practice, to more business inputs than the sales tax. We 
assume that the treatment of services inputs, building/construction inputs, and materials inputs is 
the same as under the state’s sales tax. However, we assume that all machinery and equipment 
inputs and energy purchases under the gross receipts tax are fully taxed, with a few exceptions 
for energy in the past few years for New Mexico. 
In the case of Washington, we also need to calculate gross receipts taxes that are 
nominally owed by each firm, based on its Washington sales (assumed in the model to be 10 
percent of gross output for export-base industries, 100 percent for non-export-base industries). 
This is because these gross receipts paid by the firm can be offset by R&D tax credits in 
Washington, and we need to know what the maximum credit is that can be taken. However, we 
do NOT, even in Washington, treat the gross receipts tax on the firm’s own receipts as being a 
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business tax burden. So we essentially treat the R&D tax credit taken against the gross receipts 
tax as being a refundable credit to the firm whose magnitude is determined by this feature of the 
tax system.    
R&D Tax Incentives  
Research and development tax incentives are one of the most complicated state tax 
incentives, both complex to understand and complex to model. R&D tax incentives began at the 
federal level, and perhaps in many states, as a way of targeting only INCREASES in R&D 
spending.  But in practice, as these incentives have evolved, they frequently target simply any 
firm with high R&D spending, and to some extent any firm at all. This is particularly true at the 
state level, where the “base” R&D spending for new firms is low.  
Many states use the federal base definitions in calculating R&D incentives. There is no 
substitute for simply quoting the relevant federal law for defining the R&D base for calculating 
federal R&D incentives.  It is as follows:   
“    (c) Base amount 
 
(1) In general 
 
The term “base amount” means the product of— 
 
(A) the fixed-base percentage, and 
 
(B) the average annual gross receipts of the taxpayer for the 4 taxable years preceding the 
taxable year for which the credit is being determined (hereinafter in this subsection 
referred to as the “credit year”). 
 
(2) Minimum base amount 
 
In no event shall the base amount be less than 50 percent of the qualified research 
expenses for the credit year. 
 
(3) Fixed-base percentage 
 
(A) In general 
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Except as otherwise provided in this paragraph, the fixed-base percentage is the 
percentage which the aggregate qualified research expenses of the taxpayer for taxable 
years beginning after December 31, 1983, and before January 1, 1989, is of the aggregate 
gross receipts of the taxpayer for such taxable years. 
 
(B) Start-up companies 
 
(i) Taxpayers to which subparagraph applies. The fixed-base percentage shall be 
determined under this subparagraph if— 
 
(I) the first taxable year in which a taxpayer had both gross receipts and qualified 
research expenses begins after December 31, 1983, or 
 
(II) there are fewer than 3 taxable years beginning after December 31, 1983, and before 
January 1, 1989, in which the taxpayer had both gross receipts and qualified research 
expenses. 
 
(ii) Fixed-base percentage. In a case to which this subparagraph applies, the fixed-base 
percentage is— 
 
(I) 3 percent for each of the taxpayer’s 1st 5 taxable years beginning after December 31, 
1993, for which the taxpayer has qualified research expenses, 
 
(II) in the case of the taxpayer’s 6th such taxable year, 1/6 of the percentage which the 
aggregate qualified research expenses of the taxpayer for the 4th and 5th such taxable 
years is of the aggregate gross receipts of the taxpayer for such years, 
 
(III) in the case of the taxpayer’s 7th such taxable year, 1/3 of the percentage which the 
aggregate qualified research expenses of the taxpayer for the 5th and 6th such taxable 
years is of the aggregate gross receipts of the taxpayer for such years, 
 
(IV) in the case of the taxpayer’s 8th such taxable year, 1/2 of the percentage which the 
aggregate qualified research expenses of the taxpayer for the 5th, 6th, and 7th such 
taxable years is of the aggregate gross receipts of the taxpayer for such years, 
 
(V) in the case of the taxpayer’s 9th such taxable year, 2/3 of the percentage which the 
aggregate qualified research expenses of the taxpayer for the 5th, 6th, 7th, and 8th such 
taxable years is of the aggregate gross receipts of the taxpayer for such years, 
 
(VI) in the case of the taxpayer’s 10th such taxable year, 5/6 of the percentage which the 
aggregate qualified research expenses of the taxpayer for the 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, and 9th 
such taxable years is of the aggregate gross receipts of the taxpayer for such years, and 
 
(VII) for taxable years thereafter, the percentage which the aggregate qualified research 
expenses for any 5 taxable years selected by the taxpayer from among the 5th through the 
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10th such taxable years is of the aggregate gross receipts of the taxpayer for such selected 
years. 
 
41(c)(3)(B)(iii) TREATMENT OF DE MINIMIS AMOUNTS OF GROSS RECEIPTS 
AND QUALIFIED RESEARCH EXPENSES.—The Secretary may prescribe regulations 
providing that de minimis amounts of gross receipts and qualified research expenses shall 
be disregarded under clauses (i) and (ii). 
 
41(c)(3)(C) MAXIMUM FIXED-BASE PERCENTAGE.—In no event shall the fixed-
base percentage exceed 16 percent.” 
 
This is the standard federal base definition. There also is an alternative base calculation 
which was adopted more recently, which we ignore both for simplicity’s sake and because not all 
states that use the federal base calculation allow the alternative calculation. 
At the state level, the key thing to understand is that the state R&D incentives will be 
based on the firm’s R&D spending in the state and not nationally, and on the firm’s gross 
receipts from the state and not its gross receipts nationally. In our model, we are assuming a firm 
new to the state, with no previous taxable nexus with the state. Therefore, its prior state R&D 
spending is zero, and its prior gross receipts are zero. Furthermore, for the export-base firms that 
are the focus of this model, what matters are the firm’s gross receipts from this state. These are 
assumed to be only 10 percent of the firm’s gross output. 
The consequence of this is that this new firm initially has no prior R&D spending in the 
state, and certainly no prior spending during the 1983-to-1989 period. Therefore, the firm for 
state purposes is a “start-up” firm even if it has a long history nationally. Furthermore, its 
previous gross receipts in this state are zero. And once it starts up, its gross receipts will be only 
10 percent of its total output if it is in an export-base industry (100 percent if the firm is in a non-
export-base industry). 
As a consequence, during the initial five years (for example), for export base firms, the 
“fixed base percentage” will be 3 percent of state gross receipts, which will be only 0.3 percent 
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of the firm’s total output. In many cases, the firm’s R&D spending will exceed 0.6 percent of the 
firm’s total output. In those cases, the provision that will be invoked in these states is that the 
base must be at least half of actual research spending. The effect is that in these cases the state’s 
R&D credit is in effect applied to half of the firm’s research spending for its first five years in 
the state. 
The base amount then ratchets up in subsequent years, so that by years 11 through 20, the 
base-year percentage of the firm’s gross receipts in this state is based on the ratio of state 
research spending to state gross receipts in various years from years 5 through 10. Because we 
are assuming a firm has fixed real state research spending and real state output and real gross 
receipts allocable to this state, it might seem as if now the base is simply equal to actual research 
spending for the state, and the firm will receive no R&D credit. But this is not true for the higher 
R&D spending industries. The maximum provision is that the base never can be greater than 16 
percent of gross receipts, which for export-base industries will amount to 1.6 percent of the 
firm’s gross output as measured in our model.  
At an extreme, for example, the R&D spending-to-output ratio for computers is 14.9 
percent in our model.  Because this is more than twice the firm’s maximum percentage applied to 
its base of 1.6 percent of the firm’s gross output (16 percent of the firm’s state gross receipts), 
the minimum rule still applies. Even in years 11–20, firms in the computer industry will still 
nominally be able to claim R&D credits on half their research spending.  Of course, these credits 
may exceed the firm’s state taxes, in which case they must be carried forward unless the state 
R&D credit is refundable (which it is in a few states, most notably Iowa, Louisiana, 
Massachusetts [life sciences only], Minnesota [in the past], Nebraska, New York, and 
Pennsylvania).     
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Other states use their own bases, in which state research spending is compared with past 
research spending in the state. Again, for firms new to a state, which is what we are modeling 
here, these R&D credits end up being awarded to most if not all of the firm’s research spending 
for its first years. Some states even more explicitly seek to award all research spending, not just 
incremental spending, by defining R&D spending relative to some lower percentage of prior 
research spending, or by having a separate research credit on base spending. 
The bottom line is that state R&D credits can for some firms be quite large. The only 
factor limiting these credits is that, in many states, there is only a certain annual dollar volume of 
credits to be handed out. Once these are allocated, either selectively or first-come first-served, 
the state is not obligated to hand out any more.  What this means is that this model’s calculation 
of the dollar magnitude of R&D credits represents a best-case scenario for the firm (and a worst-
case scenario for the state’s revenue base) of the firm being able to get access to the nominally 
available R&D credits.  
As with the investment tax credits (ITCs) and job creation tax credits (JCTCs), R&D tax 
credits (R&DTCs) are sometimes refundable, but in other cases are limited either by corporate 
tax liabilities or in some cases by corporate tax liabilities plus the firm’s payments to the state, 
either against some other business tax liabilities or sometimes also against workers’ withholding 
taxes.  
Wage Standards  
Some states have wage standards that apply to JCTCs, or in South Carolina’s case ITCs. 
These standards typically vary the amount of credit so that higher-wage jobs are favored. 
To deal with this, we try to approximate the distribution of wages for each industry. To 
calculate the wage distribution of workers by industry requires some assumptions. We assume 
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that wages of each firm are lognormally distributed. The mean ln(wage) is calculated for each 
industry, based on mean wages and assuming log normality of wages. The variation of ln(wage) 
within establishments is assumed to be 0.287, based on Barth et al. (2014). With an assumed 
mean ln(wage) and variance of such, we can generate for each industry the proportion of workers 
in each wage category. These industry proportions, and the formula for how JCTCs or ITCs vary 
with the number of workers in different wage categories, allows us to calculate credits for a state 
that vary by the industry’s wages.   
Personal Income Tax Withholdings   
For some credits in some states and some years, the credit can be written off against the 
withholdings the firm does against the personal income tax liability of employees. Therefore, to 
figure out how much in these credits can be taken, such personal income tax withholdings need 
to be calculated for a typical firm in each industry, even though such personal income tax 
withholdings are not a business tax liability or burden of the firm. To do so requires some data 
on average effective personal income tax rates in each state.  
To calculate average effective personal income tax rates, we take data from the Institute 
on Taxation and Economic Policy (ITEP) on effective personal income tax rates for different 
income groups (Davis et. al. 2013). ITEP breaks down these personal income tax liabilities into 
seven groups: 1, 2, 3, and 4) the four bottom quintiles, 5) the top 1 percent, 6) the next 4 percent 
(95th through 99th percentiles), and 7) the next 15 percent (80th through 95th percentiles). For 
each group, in addition to reporting the average effective personal income tax rate, ITEP reports 
the average income level for that income group. Using these data, we can calculate the average 
effective personal income tax rate in the state. This average effective personal income tax rate is 
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applied to the firm’s wage payments to determine a plausible value of income tax withholdings, 
which will limit the credits that can be taken for some state credits.3  
Inflation and the Real Value of Credits Provided over Time or Delayed through 
Carry-Forwards  
Some credits have a nominal value but are awarded over multiple years. For example, 
this is sometimes true of investment tax credits and job creation tax credits. In addition, in cases 
where tax credits are carried forward, what is carried forward into future tax years is the 
remaining nominal value of the credit. As a result, inflation erodes the real value of these credits. 
For all these cases, the nominal credit available in future years is adjusted for price 
changes between the time the credit was awarded and the time the credit is taken. This 
adjustment is based on actual inflation rates observed in the nation, where such data are 
available. For years beyond the present, the most recent inflation rate is assumed to be continued 
for the next 20 years.  
Minimum Taxes 
As mentioned in the main text, credits are often limited to no more than the corporate 
income tax liability, or sometimes the corporate income tax liability plus business payments 
under some other tax (e.g., gross receipts tax payments, sales tax payments on sales, sales tax 
payments on input purchases, or withholdings for workers). However, more complicated 
situations can arise because some states have credit limitations that lead to effective minimum 
tax rates.  
                                                 
3 Ideally, it would be nice to vary the effective personal income tax rate by industry. We leave that to future 
versions of this model.  
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For example, in Illinois, most credits can only be taken against the regular corporate 
income tax. This means that the replacement corporate income tax acts as a minimum tax for 
many firms. Firms can take an investment tax credit against this replacement tax, but no other 
credits.  
In Connecticut, in general credits are limited to 70 percent of the initial corporate income 
tax liability. This effectively establishes a minimum corporate tax liability of 30 percent of the 
corporate income tax. Connecticut did have a job creation tax credit for two years that overrode 
this limit, but otherwise no combination of the various ITCs, JCTCs, and R&DTCs could exceed 
70 percent of the corporate income tax in Connecticut in one year. The rest had to be carried 
forward. 
New York also formerly had an effective alternative minimum tax. In general, the various 
credits in New York could not lower firms’ tax liability below what would be obtained by 
multiplying the firms’ profits (after adjusting for property taxes, abatements, and sales taxes) by 
this AMT rate. The rest had to be carried forward, or taken against other tax bases if allowed. In 
addition, there was one exception to this rule: the Empire Zone program from 2001 to 2009 
allowed a large percentage of the corporate income tax to be wiped out without considering the 
AMT.  After examining AMTs in other states (California, Florida, Iowa, Kentucky, Minnesota), 
it does not appear that they really limit state tax credits. These AMTs basically serve to allow 
states to add back in various tax preferences permitted under the normal federal corporate 
income tax.  
In addition, for many state tax credits, there is some provision that limits the tax credit to 
being no more than x percent of the state corporate income tax. Contrary to what one might 
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think, this provision is interpreted very differently by the revenue authorities in the various 
states.  
In many states, this limit is simply interpreted as saying that this individual credit cannot 
be taken in any one year to be more than x percent of the firm’s corporate income tax liability 
before any other credits are taken (Massachusetts, New Mexico, Tennessee, Texas). This may 
limit the tax credit in that year, or it may not. For example, if other credits are present that 
already reduce corporate income tax liability by (1 − x) percent or more, then the x percent limit 
on this credit does not limit the credit any more than it is limited already by total corporate tax 
liability.  
In South Carolina, credits can be taken in any order preferred by the firm (with the 
exception that the R&D credit must be taken last), and the 50 percent credit limit applies to the 
remaining tax liability measured sequentially. In Georgia, in contrast, the 50 percent limit on the 
R&D credit means that this credit must be taken after all other credits have been taken, and the 
credit is limited to 50 percent of the remaining tax liability after all other credits have been taken.  
Finally, in North Carolina, all the credits that are subject to the 50 percent limit are 
summed together; after all other credits are taken, these credits collectively are limited to no 
more than 50 percent of the remaining tax liability.    
A final credit point is about what “refundability” means. If refundability is 100 percent, 
there is no limit: 100 percent of the credit is allowed. If the credit refundability is limited to some 
percentage x of less than 100 percent, state rules in general interpret this as follows: after the 
credit is taken against the corporate income tax (or whatever taxes the credit is being taken 
against), x percent of the REMAINING credit can be refunded. It is not x percent of the original 
credit before some of it was taken against the corporate income tax. Furthermore, in a few cases, 
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such as Massachusetts, the 90 percent refundability allowed also means that the remaining 10 
percent can no longer be carried forward. Given that we assume a 12 percent real discount rate 
we would assume that the firm would prefer 90 percent upfront.  
Deductibility of Federal Corporate Income Taxes from State Income Taxes  
A few states allow federal corporate income taxes to be totally or partially deducted in 
calculating state corporate income tax liability. For these states, we assume the effective 
corporate income tax rate is not the nominal state tax rate, but rather a function of that rate,4 
specifically:  
Effective state tax rate  =  Nominal state rate × [1 − (proportion of federal tax that 
is deductible) × (effective federal corporate income tax rate)]. 
Based on USGAO (2013), the effective federal corporate income rate is assumed to be 12.6 
percent.  
 The federal corporate income tax allows all state and local taxes and credits to be 
considered in calculating the federal tax. However, in our model we ignore federal corporate 
taxes because such taxes would have the same proportional effects in all states and cities. That is, 
if our model calculates state and local taxes and incentives as a percentage of value-added to be 
Ts and Is, and the federal corporate income tax rate on that firm is Tf, then the actual taxes and 
incentives as a percentage of value-added will be Ts(1 − Tf) and Is(1 − Tf), a proportional 
adjustment that is the same in all states and cities.  
                                                 
4 This calculation ignores feedback effects because, in turn, the federal corporate income tax will allow 
deductibility of net taxes paid to the state, after allowing for all incentives. This is ignored because it would be 
complex to allow for, and the interaction effect will be minor, as it depends on the effective federal rate of 12.6 
percent, multiplied by an effective net state rate which is likely to be even lower after considering all state 
incentives.   
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APPENDIX B:  SOME RESULTS ON FORMULA APPORTIONMENT 
After this new firm is located in a state, the formula for the percentage of its national 
taxes that are apportioned to this state is 
(1) 𝐹 = 𝑃 × 𝑆𝑒 + 𝑃 × 𝑆𝐼 + 𝑋𝑡 × 𝑆𝑐 . 
F is the proportion of the firm’s total national profits that are apportioned to this state.  P is the 
proportion of the firm’s total payroll located in the state. It is assumed equal to the proportion of 
the firm’s total property that is located in the state. Xt is the proportion of the firm’s total sales 
that are apportioned to this state.  Se, SI, and Sc are the weights in the state’s profit apportionment 
formula on the shares of payroll, property, and sales in the state.  
The weights in the apportionment formula must sum to 1, or 
(2) 𝑆𝑒 + 𝑆𝐼 + 𝑆𝑐 = 1 . 
All other states with which the firm has “taxable nexus” (that is, has some property or 
payroll) also have an apportionment formula. After the firm has located in the new state, this 
apportionment formula is given by 
(3) 𝐹𝑜 = 𝑃𝑜 × 𝑆𝑒




Here, the “o” superscript indicates these variables are for “all other taxable nexus states.”  





𝑜 = 1 . 
The firm’s property and payroll after the new-firm location decision are solely located in 
this state, and all other taxable nexus states. Therefore, it follows that 
(5) 𝑃 + 𝑃𝑜 = 1 . 
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On the other hand, the sales of the firm are to this state, all other taxable nexus states, and 
all other nontaxable nexus states, or 
(6) 𝑋 + 𝑋𝑜 + 𝑋𝑛 = 1 . 
X, 𝑋𝑜 , and 𝑋𝑛 are the proportions of the firm’s sales that are made in this state, all other taxable 
nexus states, and all nontaxable nexus states. 
The proportion of sales allocated to this state is given by 
(7) 𝑋𝑡 = 𝑋 + 𝑅𝑃𝑋
𝑛 . 
Here, R is a dummy for whether the state uses “throwback.” If the state does use throwback, then 
R = 1. In that case, the proportion of sales in this state is increased by throwing back sales to 
nontaxable nexus states to the state in which those goods and services were produced. We 
assume this is the same as allocating by the payroll or property proportions. If the state does not 
use throwback, then R = 0, and the proportion of sales used in the apportionment formula is 
simply the proportion of sales made in this state.  
A similar formula holds after the new firm’s location for other states in which the firm 
has a taxable nexus: 
(8) 𝑋𝑡
𝑜 = 𝑋𝑜 + 𝑅𝑜𝑃𝑜𝑋𝑛 . 
Before new firm location, the apportionment formula for these other states was different. 
It was  





The proportion of property and payroll in all other states before the new firm was 1. The 
proportion of sales allocated to this state was given by 
(10) 𝑋𝑡
𝑜𝑏 = 𝑋𝑜 + 𝑅𝑜 × (𝑋𝑛 + 𝑋) . 
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That is, the throwback rule, if it existed in these other states, allocated sales from both this state 
and the consistently nontaxable nexus states.  
We assume that profits obtained from each state are proportional to the post-new-firm 
allocation of payroll and property: 
(11) 𝜋 = MP, and 
(12) 𝜋𝑜 = MP𝑜 
Before the new firm opened in this state, the firm’s state taxes paid were given by 
(13) 𝑇𝑂𝑏 = 𝑡𝑜 × 𝜋𝑜 × 𝐹𝑜𝑏 . 
𝑇𝑂𝑏 is the total tax revenue collected from the corporate income tax in these other states before 
the new plant location decision, and 𝑡𝑜 is the corporate income tax rate in these other states.  
After the new plant location decision, the firm now pays corporate income taxes in this 
state and in the other states in which it has taxable nexus. The tax paid in these other states is 
given by 
(14) 𝑇𝑜 = 𝑡𝑜 × (𝜋 + 𝜋𝑜) × 𝐹𝑜 . 
Here, 𝑇𝑜 simply gives the tax revenue collected from the corporate income tax in these other 
states after the new firm has located in this state, and it is simply equal to the tax rate times the 
profits of the firm from this plant and all other facilities, times the apportionment share given by 
the after formula. 
The firm also pays tax in this state, given by 
(15) 𝑇 = 𝑡 × (𝜋 + 𝜋𝑜) × 𝐹 . 
Here, T is total tax revenue from the corporate income tax collected in this state and is simply 
equal to the state’s tax rate t times combined profits times the formula used to apportion profits.  
The change in taxes due to this new branch plant in this state is given by 
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(16) ∆Taxes = 𝑇 + 𝑇𝑜 − 𝑇𝑜𝑏 ; 
(17) ∆Taxes = 𝑡 × (𝜋 + 𝜋𝑜) × 𝐹 + 𝑡𝑜 × (𝜋 + 𝜋𝑜) × 𝐹𝑜 − 𝑡𝑜 × 𝜋𝑜 × 𝐹𝑜𝑏 . 
This can be rewritten as 
(18) ∆Taxes = 𝑡 × 𝜋 × (𝐹 + 𝐹𝑜) + (𝑡 − 𝑡𝑜)(𝜋𝑜 × 𝐹 − 𝜋 × 𝐹𝑜) + 𝑡𝑜 × 𝜋𝑜(𝐹 + 𝐹𝑜 − 𝐹𝑜𝑏) . 
Suppose initially that there is completely effective throwback. Then 𝐹𝑜𝑏 = 1. Suppose 
further that this state and other states use a similar apportionment formula. Then 𝐹 + 𝐹𝑜 will 
sum to 1.  Under these assumptions, the last term cancels out. 
Suppose that this new state has similar tax rates t to the tax rates 𝑡𝑜 in the other states in 
which the firm has a taxable nexus. Then the second term is zero. 
Finally, under these assumptions, the first term is just (t × π). The marginal taxes 
associated with this new plant are simply equal to the corporate tax rate in this state times the 
profits in this state.  
If the apportionment formulas in this state and other states are close to the payroll/property 
share in each state, we don’t even need the taxes in the states to be similar. Apportionment 
formulas will be close to the payroll/property share if any one of the following conditions holds: 
 The sales factor is small; 
 The relative sales between this state and other states are close to the relative payroll 
and property shares—which might hold, for example, if the firm tends to locate its 
plants in more populous states; 
 The sales in this state and other states are small relative to sales in nontaxable nexus 
states, which results in these sales being thrown back based on the property factor.  
 
In any event, if F = P, and 𝐹𝑜 = 𝑃𝑜 , then the second parentheses in Equation (18) can be 
rewritten as 
(19) 𝜋𝑜 × 𝐹 − 𝜋 × 𝐹𝑜 = 𝜋𝑜 × 𝑃 − 𝜋 × 𝑃𝑜 . 
And, substituting in the assumption that profits are proportional to property in each state 
(Equations 11 and 12), we get 
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(20) 𝜋𝑜 × 𝐹 − 𝜋 × 𝐹𝑜 = 𝑀 × 𝑃𝑜 × 𝑃 − 𝑀 × 𝑃 × 𝑃𝑜 = 0 .  
Therefore, under those assumptions, marginal taxes on the new plant reduce to the taxes levied 
by this state on the plant, regardless of the relative tax rates in this state versus other states.  
What about if there is no throwback rule? Let’s consider the extreme case where there is 
no throwback rule in any state, and all states use a 100 percent sales factor for formula 
apportionment.  Then Equation (18) can be rewritten as 
(21) ∆Taxes = 𝑡 × 𝜋 × (𝑋 + 𝑋𝑜) + (𝑡 − 𝑡𝑜)(𝜋𝑜 × 𝑋 − 𝜋 × 𝑋𝑜) + 𝑡𝑜 × 𝜋𝑜(𝑋 + 𝑋𝑜 − 𝑋𝑜) . 
The second term is then close to zero if the tax rate t in this state is similar to the tax rate 
𝑡𝑜 in other states.  The first term is the effective tax rate in this state, adjusted downward for the 
proportion of “nowhere income.” [(𝑋 + 𝑋𝑜) is equal to (1 − 𝑋𝑛), where 𝑋𝑛 is the proportion of 
sales in states with no taxable nexus.] The third term is the extra tax due because locating in this 
new state reduces the proportion of nowhere income. If the proportion of sales in this new state is 
small compared to the proportion of production and profits, then this last term is small compared 
to the first term.  
For example, suppose that tax rates are 10 percent in both states, that profits and 
production in this new state are 10 percent of profits and production in all other states, that sales 
in this new state are 1 percent of total national sales, and that nowhere sales and income are 10 
percent of total sales. Then Equation (21) can be rewritten as 
(22) ∆Taxes = 0.10 × 𝜋 × 0.90 + zero for second term + 0.10 × (9 × 𝜋) × (0.01) =
0.09 × 𝜋 + 0.009 × 𝜋 . 
Therefore, the third term only adds 10 percent to the first term. As a result, under these 
circumstances, it is largely possible to still write profits as a function of this state’s effective tax 
rate on corporate income, after adjusting for nowhere income.  
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As mentioned in the main text of this paper, in the real world, shifting to a greater weight 
on sales factor apportionment, even without eliminating the throwback rule, seems to result in 
less state corporate income tax revenue. This can be seen as reductions in revenue due, in 
Equation (18), to corporations exploiting differences in formula apportionment across states, and 
ambiguities about where sales occur, to reduce effective tax rates in this state below what would 
be predicted based on the apportionment formula. Eliminating throwback rules then results in a 
further loss, equal to the average amount of nowhere income.  
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APPENDIX C:  THE SIXTEEN EXCLUDED INDUSTRIES 
 As mentioned in the main text, the 2011 Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) database 
that is used in conjunction with 2011 IRS data to create industry balance sheets allows for 
calculation of balance sheet information for 61 industries. Sixteen of those industries, comprising 
almost 25 percent of value-added but less than 10 percent of employment and wages, are 
excluded from the main text’s calculations.  
 As also mentioned in the main text, these 16 industries were principally excluded because 
either their tax or incentive data were felt to be unreliable, or the industry was strongly location-
tied despite being an export-base industry. Table C1 presents incentive and tax statistics for the 
16 excluded industries. As shown in that table, a number of these industries have implausibly 
high ratios of gross taxes to value-added based on combining their balance sheet information 
with normal state and local business taxes. These include many industries in transportation, 
funds and trusts, oil and gas, and agriculture. For many of these industries, the state and local 
business tax system may have special business tax rules, which are not at present incorporated in 
the model. Therefore, these industries are excluded.  
 Some industries have more realistic ratios, but I decided to exclude all mining, 
agriculture, and transportation industries as industries that 1) are not particularly footloose and 
therefore are unlikely to be good economic development targets, and 2) frequently have special 
tax rules or incentive rules that are not reflected in the model. Finally, for motion pictures, the 
database at present does not include film incentives, so this industry also is dropped.  
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Net taxes/  
value-added (%) 
Rail transportation 1 4.89 34.09 29.20 
Real estate 0 1.56 32.12 30.56 
Pipeline transportation 1 3.54 25.55 22.01 
Utilities 1 2.95 22.84 19.89 
Funds, trusts, and other financial vehicles 1 2.92 19.49 16.57 
Water transportation 1 1.21 17.99 16.78 
Oil and gas extraction 1 2.78 17.45 14.68 
Air transportation 1 1.39 13.84 12.45 
Agricultural production 1 1.51 12.06 10.56 
Truck transportation 1 1.15 8.64 7.49 
Support activities for mining 1 1.53 7.45 5.93 
Transit and ground passenger transportation 1 1.53 7.37 5.84 
Mining, except oil and gas 1 1.08 6.53 5.45 
Forestry, fishing and related activities 1 1.50 5.88 4.38 
Other transportation and support activities 1 1.30 5.55 4.25 
Motion picture and sound recording industries 1 0.62 2.49 1.87 
NOTE: These are 16 industries for which data were originally collected, but which are excluded from the main text’s analysis. 
The ratios reported are ratios of the present value of incentives or taxes to the present value of value-added for the industry. The 
ratios are states as percentages of value-added. 
SOURCE: Author’s calculations. 
 
 
 Table C2 illustrates some of the unusual balance sheet ratios in 2 of the 16 excluded 
industries: 1) funds and trusts and 2) real estate. For example, in these two industries, the ratio of 
property per full-time-equivalent (FTE) worker is extremely high. Without incorporating special 
tax rules, these balance sheet oddities result in very high ratios of gross business taxes to value-
added.   
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Table C2  Descriptions of Two Industries: Funds and Trusts, Real Estate 
 Funds and trusts Real estate 
Value-added/gross output (%) 38.4 75.3 
Compensation/value-added (%) 36.4 4.3 
Wages/compensation (%) 57.2 86.3 
Intermediate inputs/gross output (%) 61.6 24.7 
Energy/intermediate inputs (%) 0.0 13.5 
Materials/intermediate inputs (%) 0.3 4.6 
Services/intermediate inputs (%) 99.7 81.9 
Profits/gross output (%) 2.4 7.0 
Profits/value-added (%) 6.4 9.3 
Profits/property (%) 1.1 0.9 
Property/value-added (ratio) 5.77 10.09 
Real property/total property (%) 96.9 99.5 
Land/real property (%) 0.2 9.3 
Structures/real property (%) 99.8 90.7 
Personal property/total property (%) 3.1 0.5 
Inventories/personal property (%) 0.0 4.0 
Non-inv personal/personal property (%) 100.0 96.0 
Deprec structure/value (%) 2.6 2.3 
Deprec machinery/value (%) 13.9 16.4 
Value-added/FTE ($) 529,373 1,395,400 
Compensation/FTE ($) 192,446 59,552 
Wages/FTE ($) 110,024 51,403 
R&D/output (%) 0.1 0.0 
R&D/FTE ($) 1,554 316 
Property/FTE ($) 3,052,187 14,083,359 
Mach&equip/FTE ($) 95,181 65,601 
Profits/FTE ($) 33,754 130,289 
   
Industry share of total private value-added (%) 0.33 13.72 
NOTE: These ratios are calculated by combining 2011 data from BEA with 2011 data from the IRS statistics of income. FTE is 
the number of full-time-equivalent workers in the industry. 
SOURCE: Author’s calculations. 
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APPENDIX D:  EFFECT OF ALTERING INDUSTRY PROFITABILITY ASSUMPTIONS 
 As mentioned in the text, one might question the profitability assumptions made in the 
database and wonder how these assumptions affect the incentive calculations for different 
industries. The database takes IRS profitability information for corporations making profits in 
one particular year, and for each industry it blows these up to industry totals using the ratio of 
that industry’s BEA gross output to that industry’s IRS gross receipts. Obviously there are many 
assumptions being made here. One might wonder whether the incentive variation across 
industries might be sensitive to these assumptions. If profits are higher, incentives will tend to be 
greater. With higher profits, corporate income tax collections will be higher. With higher 
corporate income-tax collections, nonrefundable tax credits can be taken more fully without 
utilizing carry-forwards.  
 In this appendix, taxes and incentives for different industries are calculated using 
alternative profit assumptions. Specifically, we assume that all industries have the same ratio of 
profits to value-added. The assumed same ratio of profits to value-added is the maximum 
observed among the 45 industries. This maximum ratio is 35.8 percent of value-added, which is 
observed for both management of companies (an export-base industry), and credit intermediation 
(a non-export-base industry).  
 This uniform industry profit rate represents a significant increase for many industries. 
Among the 31 export-base industries, the mean ratio of profits to value-added is 24.4 percent 
(see Table 2 of text). Therefore, on average this alternative profit rate assumption is increasing 
profits among export-base industries by almost one-half. This in turn will increase the 
opportunities to more fully claim credits by almost one-half. Among export-base industries, the 
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minimum calculated ratio of profits to value-added is for insurance carriers, at 14.8 percent of 
value-added. For this industry, the alternative profit rate assumption is increasing profits by 
about two-and-a-half times. 
 As shown in Table D1, for the 31 export-base industries, this uniform high profit rate 
assumption does, as expected, increase gross taxes, incentives, and net taxes. However, the 
increase in incentives is surprisingly modest. The unweighted industry mean goes up by less than 
5 percent, from 1.63 percent of value-added to 1.71 percent of value-added.  
 Furthermore, the new incentive and tax numbers are highly correlated with the old 
numbers. In particular, the pattern of incentives across different industries is extremely highly 
correlated with the original database pattern. As shown in Table D2, which shows the industry 
correlation matrix for the old and new tax and incentive measures, the correlation of the old and 
new incentive to the value-added ratio, using 2015 figures for the 31 export-base industries, is 
0.996.  
 The bottom line is that the pattern of incentives across industries is not extraordinarily 
sensitive to reasonable variation in profit assumptions. Obviously the pattern would be sensitive 
to cases where a firm had zero profits. But it is more reasonable to assume that firms making 
location decisions on average both expect to and actually do make some reasonable profit rate. If 
so, the incentives predicted using this database’s profit assumptions will be close to the 
incentives actually received.  
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Table D1  Descriptive Statistics for Incentives and Taxes across 31 Export-Base Industries, Baseline and Alternative Profitability Assumptions 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min p10 p25 p50 p75 p90 Max 
Baseline gross taxes/value-added 31 5.03 2.07 2.24 3.29 3.73 4.34 6.07 7.68 10.70 
Baseline incentive/value-added 31 1.63 0.42 0.68 1.11 1.41 1.60 1.84 2.22 2.66 
Baseline net taxes/value-added 31 3.40 1.90 0.94 1.75 2.09 2.82 4.25 5.66 9.12 
Alternative gross taxes/value-added 31 5.55 2.10 3.00 3.78 4.11 4.85 6.17 8.15 11.40 
Alternative incentives/value-added 31 1.71 0.45 0.69 1.20 1.44 1.67 1.93 2.34 2.81 
Alternative net taxes/value-added 31 3.84 1.91 1.62 2.23 2.57 3.40 4.62 6.00 9.73 
NOTE: Table shows descriptive statistics for ratio of present value of taxes or incentives to present value of value-added stated in percentage terms. The descriptive statistics are 
for a facility starting up in 2015, and are national averages for each of 31 export-base industries. The calculations are made under two profitability assumptions. The baseline 
assumptions use the IRS-to-BEA conversions outlined in the text for each industry. The alternative assumptions use the same uniformly high ratio of profits to value-added for 
each of the 31 industries. 
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Table D2  Correlations across Industries of Tax and Incentive Calculations under Alternative Profitability Assumptions 












Baseline gross taxes/ 
value-added 
1     
CI LB 1     
CI UB 1     
       
Baseline incentive/ 
value-added 
0.4964 1    
CI LB 0.1723 1    
CI UB 0.7235 1    
       
Baseline net 
taxes/value-added 
0.9814 0.3204 1   
CI LB 0.9613 −0.0383 1   
CI UB 0.9911 0.6059 1   
       
Alternative gross taxes/ 
value-added 
0.9937 0.5125 0.9710 1  
CI LB 0.9869 0.1933 0.9400 1  
CI UB 0.9970 0.7336 0.9860 1  
       
Alternative incentives/ 
value-added 
0.4884 0.9964 0.3124 0.5131 1  
CI LB 0.1621 0.9924 −0.0471 0.1940 1  
CI UB 0.7184 0.9983 0.6003 0.7340 1  
       
Alternative net taxes/ 
value-added 
0.9786 0.3308 0.9946 0.9797 0.3305 1 
CI LB 0.9556 −0.0267 0.9888 0.9579 −0.0270 1 
CI UB 0.9897 0.6132 0.9974 0.9903 0.6131 1 
NOTE: This table reports the correlation matrix, for 2015, across 31 export-base industries, of tax and incentive to value-added ratios, using baseline and alternative profitability 
measures for industries. In addition to reporting the correlation, the matrix reports the 95 confidence interval lower bound (CI LB) and upper bound (CI UB) for each estimated 
correlation.  
SOURCE: Author’s calculations  
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APPENDIX E:  COMPARISON WITH OTHER STUDIES 
 This appendix compares this database’s results with other research that has tried to 
quantify state and local incentives or business taxes. Comparisons are done to the following 
other studies: 
 The model by Alan Peters and Peter Fisher (2002) of state and local incentives and 
taxes for manufacturing industries in 1990 and 1998.  
 
 The model by the Tax Foundation and KPMG (2012, 2015) of state and local net 
taxes, after incentives, in 2011 and 2014, for seven specific industries. 
 
 Estimates by Ernst and Young (Cline, Phillips, and Newbig 2011) of weighted 
average for various industries (most weight on manufacturing) of gross state and local 
business taxes on new investment, as of 2009.     
 
 Estimates by Ernst and Young for average overall business taxes as a percentage of 
value-added, for 2003 and 2014 (Cline et al. 2004; Phillips et al. 2015). 
 
 Estimates by Ernst and Young of the division of state and local business taxes by type 
of tax in 2014.  
 
  Estimates by Good Jobs First of “Megadeals,” with incentive costs exceeding a total 
over all years of the facility of $75 million per firm, for each year from 1990 to 2015. 
 
What should reasonably be expected from these comparisons? Given that the different 
studies use different methodologies and data and are not trying to measure exactly the same 
incentive and tax concepts, we would not expect these other studies to perfectly agree, either 
between themselves or with the current database. However, given that the studies and the current 
database are seeking to measure incentive and tax concepts that are related, one would hope that 
in most cases the estimates are at least somewhat positively correlated. Where the estimates 
differ from the current database, many of these differences do not necessarily mean that one 
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estimate is wrong and the other is right, because the studies are not necessarily seeking to 
measure exactly the same concept.  
Overall, the below-presented comparisons do show the expected positive correlations. In 
particular, the pattern of incentives or net taxes across different states in these other studies, and 
in the current study, tend to show positive correlations, which are often significant even with the 
limited number of states available for comparison.  
Peters/Fisher 
 This database’s approach is similar to the approach previously used in two books by Alan 
Peters and Peter Fisher (Fisher and Peters 1998; Peters and Fisher 2002). (Their approach, in 
turn, builds on earlier work—for example research by Leslie Papke [1987].) The commonality is 
that both use a hypothetical firm approach. In both this database and in the Peters/Fisher work, 
the impact of incentives and taxes is measured by using data on how a new facility’s balance 
sheet will be affected by state and local business taxes and incentives.  
 For comparison with our studies, we consider the average results reported for 
manufacturing in Peters and Fisher (2002) for 1990 and 1998. We compare their results with the 
average results in our database for manufacturing for the same years. We compare results for the 
19 states for which we have overlapping results. Specifically, we focus on the correlation across 
the 19 states between the gross tax rates, incentive rates, and net tax rates in the Peters/Fisher 
model versus the current database. 
 Before looking at the results, there are some differences (and some similarities) between 
our models that should be mentioned, including the following: 
 The Peters/Fisher model estimates gross tax rates, incentive rates, and net tax rates as 
a percentage change in the rate of return or profit rate; the current database estimates 
gross tax rates, incentive rates, and net tax rates as a percentage of value-added.  
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 Peters and Fisher calculate the manufacturing average by weighting different 
industries by employment; the current database calculates weighted averages using 
value-added by industry weights.  
 Both models examine the tax rates and incentive rates applying to a new facility over 
a 20-year period.  
 The Peters/Fisher model uses a 10 percent real discount rate; the current database 
uses a 12 percent real discount rate.  
 Peters and Fisher do not appear to account for discretionary credits, which the current 
database tries to include if they are common enough and can be described by some 
rule explaining their likely value to a hypothetical firm.  
 Peters and Fisher do not include R&D tax credits or customized job training 
subsidies.  
 Both models assume sufficient replacement investment that the firm has the same 
scale of operations over the entire 20-year period.  
 
Table E1 shows the results. As the table shows, the gross tax correlations all have the 
expected positive sign but are statistically insignificant. This is not too surprising, as there are 
only 19 observations when we look at just one of the years. In contrast, the incentive 
correlations are statistically significant for both years pooled together, for 1998 separately, 
and for the difference between 1990 and 1998. The incentive correlation for 1990 by itself is 
positive but statistically insignificant. For the 1990s, the Peters/Fisher model and the current 
database appear to yield considerable agreement on which states increased incentives the 
most, and on where they ended up in incentive levels toward the end of the 1990s. By 1998, 
the models appear to agree that high-incentive states included Indiana, Kentucky, Michigan, 
New York, and Iowa. In addition, as of 1998, the models agree that low-incentive states 
included Minnesota, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and Wisconsin. On the other hand, the 
models disagree about the incentive levels in Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Iowa, and 
Pennsylvania. 
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Table E1  Comparison of Peters/Fisher Model with the Current Database 
 1998 1990 
Gross tax rate Incentives Gross tax rate Incentives 
Peters/Fisher This paper Peters/Fisher This paper Peters/Fisher This paper Peters/Fisher This paper 
California 9.00 4.72 1.00 1.00 9.30 4.59 0.00 0.46 
Connecticut 8.10 7.27 0.90 2.35 9.50 8.10 0.00 1.86 
Florida 7.60 5.70 0.00 1.09 8.00 4.40 0.00 0.00 
Illinois 5.50 4.42 0.40 1.30 5.90 4.79 0.40 0.77 
Indiana 13.60 5.12 2.80 2.60 13.80 5.47 0.00 1.77 
Iowa 2.90 5.11 0.90 2.72 5.30 5.68 1.30 0.77 
Kentucky 8.00 3.09 3.50 2.67 7.70 3.09 1.00 0.22 
Massachusetts 7.10 4.11 1.10 0.82 7.80 4.52 0.40 0.14 
Michigan 7.50 6.04 2.10 2.71 10.00 6.76 2.00 1.79 
Minnesota 8.10 5.10 0.50 0.16 9.20 6.67 1.30 0.16 
New York 6.10 4.61 2.70 1.93 6.30 5.03 2.50 1.97 
North Carolina 7.00 4.37 1.10 0.56 7.10 3.61 1.10 0.03 
Ohio 10.00 5.32 2.20 1.72 10.60 5.18 0.10 0.86 
Pennsylvania 9.30 4.96 2.00 0.36 8.90 4.74 0.70 0.05 
South Carolina 8.40 5.66 7.60 2.98 8.90 5.60 3.40 0.56 
Tennessee 7.80 3.76 0.70 0.12 8.10 4.16 0.20 0.05 
Texas 10.40 5.45 0.80 0.63 11.40 4.55 0.80 0.69 
Virginia 7.10 2.92 0.10 0.28 7.10 2.89 0.00 0.04 
Wisconsin 6.10 4.54 0.00 0.24 6.00 5.21 0.00 0.24 
         
Correlation  0.186  0.641  0.283  0.247 
Combined correlation for both years  0.243  0.580     
Correlation of differences between 
two years 
 0.367  0.600     
NOTE: This table reports Peters/Fisher gross tax rate and implied incentive rate from their Table 3.3 on pages 62–63 of Peters and Fisher (2002). The incentive rate is the 
difference between the effective tax rate after basic taxes and the effective tax rate after general incentives. Bolded correlations signify statistical significance at a 95 percent level. 
The gross tax and incentive rates reported here are manufacturing averages for these 19 states for the respective years. The rates for Peters/Fisher are effective tax rates as a 
percentage of profits. The rates for this database are tax rates as a percentage of value-added.  
SOURCE: Author’s calculations and Peters and Fisher (2002).  
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Tax Foundation/KPMG 
 The Tax Foundation and KPMG, an auditing firm based in the Netherlands, have 
calculated net tax rates for “new firms” and “mature firms” in seven industries, for each of the 
states, for two years: 2011 and 2014 (Tax Foundation and KPMG 2012, 2015).  They report net 
tax rates on profits after incentives. From reading their modeling description, their “new firm” 
tax rates appear to apply to the first year of operation. Therefore, in doing comparisons with the 
current database, this appendix compares their “new firm” tax rates with the current database’s 
net tax rate in Year 1 of the new facility’s operation.  This appendix then compares their “mature 
firm” tax rates with the current database’s net tax rate in Year 11 of the new facility operation.  
The Tax Foundation/KPMG model and the current database appear to include a similar 
set of business taxes and incentives. The TF/KPMG model includes unemployment insurance 
taxes, which are excluded from the current database because I do not regard these taxes as net 
taxes on business, given their benefits to workers. The TF/KPMG model does not include 
customized job training incentives, which are included in the current database. The TF/KPMG 
model also does not include deal-closing incentives, which are included in the current database if 
they are commonly used and if some information can be found on what rules govern their 
operation.   
Perhaps the biggest obvious difference between the TF/KPMG model and the current 
database is the treatment of formula apportionment for the corporate income tax. As described in 
the text and in Appendix B, in this database, it is assumed that increasing the sale factor and 
eliminating throwback may lower corporate income taxes, but not by as much as is implied by 
simply assuming that most of an export-base firm’s income is untaxed. In contrast, the 
TF/KPMG model appears to assume that if a firm is in certain export-base industries, and only x 
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percent of the U.S. population is in the state, that (1 − x) percent of the firm’s profits are 
essentially untaxed by the state’s corporate income tax. These assumptions about formula 
apportionment, in addition to affecting corporate income tax rates, will affect what incentives 
can be taken in a given year against the corporate income tax. In addition, the TF/KPMG model 
makes an unusual assumption about corporate headquarters—that 100 percent of its sales occur 
in-state. In contrast, this database’s model assumes that, for export-base firms, 10 percent of 
sales are in-state and 90 percent out-of-state, whereas for non-export-base firms, 100 percent of 
sales are in-state.  
Table E2 shows the results: 20 out of the 28 correlations are positive, 8 negative. Nine 
out of the 28 correlations are statistically significantly different from zero at the 95 percent level, 
and all of these are positive. Overall, the results suggest that the current database and the Tax 
Foundation/KPMG estimates at least point to roughly similar spatial patterns of incentives, 
although with many exceptions.    
 
Table E2  Correlations by Type of Firm of Tax Foundation/KPMG Measures of Net Taxes after Incentives 
with This Database’s Measure 
  Correlations by year and type of firm  
  2014 2011 
  New firms Mature firms New firms Mature firms 
export-base Truck/bus manufacturing 0.352 −0.207 0.297 −0.160 
 Steel manufacturing 0.310 0.042 0.274 0.053 
 Corp headquarters 0.366 0.712 0.285 0.573 
 Pharm R&D 0.436 −0.082 0.255 −0.080 
 Warehousing −0.138 0.421 0.041 0.496 
non-export-base Call center −0.146 0.086 −0.187 0.099 
 Retail clothing store 0.143 0.673 −0.173 0.558 
NOTE: Bolded correlations are statistically significant at 95% level. Correlations are calculated over 33 state observations that 
overlap. Correlation is between the TF/KPMG model’s net tax rate on profits and this study’s net tax rate as percentage of value-
added.  
SOURCE: Author’s calculations and Tax Foundation/KPMG (2012, 2015).  
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Ernst and Young: Marginal Gross Tax Rates on New Investment  
 Ernst and Young (Cline, Phillips, and Newbig 2011) calculate, as of 2009, for each of the 
50 states plus the District of Columbia (DC), the effective state and local gross tax rate on new 
investment in a new facility or an expanded facility for a “hypothetical firm” in five different 
industries. The reported results by state aggregate these results using various weights up to an 
overall average for each state. For the comparisons done with the current database, this appendix 
uses the results weighted by capital expenditures, which put 40 percent of the weight on durable 
manufacturing and 42 percent on nondurable manufacturing (Table 1 and Table 2, Cline, 
Phillips, and Newbig 2011). The Ernst and Young results are for taxes only and do not consider 
incentives, so the appropriate comparison is with the current database’s results for gross business 
tax rates.  
 The Ernst and Young results are similar to the current database in what taxes are 
considered: corporate income taxes, sales taxes on business inputs (including gross receipts 
taxes), and property taxes. The Ernst and Young model considers a 30-year period after the new 
or expanded facility begins operation, whereas the current database model considers a 20-year 
period. For both models, sufficient replacement investment is assumed that the scale of 
operations of the new or expanded facility remains the same for the entire period. The Ernst and 
Young calculates the tax rate as the difference in the rate of return to the new facility due to 
taxes; the current database calculates the tax rate as the ratio of the present value of state and 
local business taxes to the present value of value-added, using a 12 percent real discount rate.  
 Perhaps the major difference between the two models is formula apportionment: the Ernst 
and Young model appears to assume that for export-base firms, a high sales factor results in very 
little of the firm’s profits on the new facility being apportioned to the state, and therefore taxed. 
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As explained in this paper’s text and in Appendix B, this assumption is not necessarily correct, as 
profits elsewhere may be apportioned to the state because of the new or expanded facility. 
Therefore, the current database’s model does incorporate some reduction in effective tax rates 
due to increasing the sales factor in formula apportionment, but not as great as in the Ernst and 
Young model.  
 Table E3 compares the current database’s results with the Ernst and Young model’s 
results for the 33 states that overlap. As can be seen, the correlation between the two sets of 
results is positive and large and statistically significant at 0.704. In addition, the models agree in 
many cases on what states had high or low gross state and local business taxes in 2009. For 
example, both models agree that New Mexico, and Louisiana, and DC were the highest-gross 
business tax states. On states with low taxes, the models agree that as of 2009, Ohio, Oregon, 
Virginia, and Wisconsin were among the lowest-gross business tax states. On the other hand, the 
models also show some disagreement, sometimes dramatic. For example, in the Ernst and Young 
model, Tennessee as of 2009 is a very high business tax state, which is not true in our database. 
The current database says that in 2009 Nevada was a low business tax state, which is not true in 
the Ernst and Young model.  
Ernst and Young: Estimates of Average Business Tax Rate, 2003 and 2014 
 Ernst and Young also do an annual report for the Council on State Taxation that attempts 
to measure the overall state and local business tax burden on all businesses in each of the 50 
states plus the District of Columbia. For comparisons with the current database, we pick the 
earliest and latest of these reports, from 2003 and 2014 (Cline et al. 2004; Phillips et al. 2015). 
This allows us to look at changes over the lengthiest possible period.  
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Table E3  Comparison of This Paper’s Gross Tax Rates with Ernst and Young’s Marginal Tax Rates on New 
Investment 
State This paper’s database (%) 
Ernst and Young marginal tax rate 
on new investment (%) 
Alabama 4.31 9.70 
Arizona 4.32 9.30 
California 4.37 7.70 
Colorado 3.33 6.80 
Connecticut 4.29 8.90 
District of Columbia 5.74 16.60 
Florida 4.60 7.40 
Georgia 3.82 6.60 
Illinois 3.68 4.60 
Indiana 4.98 6.80 
Iowa 4.81 6.40 
Kentucky 3.15 6.50 
Louisiana 5.96 11.10 
Maryland 3.52 6.30 
Massachusetts 3.54 8.20 
Michigan 5.40 7.20 
Minnesota 4.83 6.00 
Missouri 4.41 7.10 
Nebraska 4.14 9.40 
Nevada 2.90 8.20 
New Jersey 3.78 7.50 
New Mexico 7.18 16.60 
New York 4.08 7.10 
North Carolina 4.16 8.60 
Ohio 2.82 4.40 
Oregon 3.25 3.80 
Pennsylvania 4.78 7.10 
South Carolina 5.53 8.90 
Tennessee 4.55 10.30 
Texas 4.43 6.90 
Virginia 2.21 5.40 
Washington 3.87 9.40 
Wisconsin 3.37 4.50 
   
Correlation across columns 0.704  
NOTE: The Ernst and Young results are from the first column of numbers in Table 2 (Cline, Phillips, and Newbig 2011). This 
database’s numbers are weighted numbers using the Ernst and Young industry weights from their Table 1 for capital 
investment. The Ernst and Young tax rates are the percentage reduction in the rate of return due to taxes. This database’s tax 
rates are the present value of gross taxes divided by the present value of value-added.  
SOURCE: Author’s calculations and Cline, Phillips, and Newbig (2011). 
 
 
 This annual Ernst and Young report uses a quite different methodology from the 
hypothetical firm method. Essentially it takes different types of state and local tax revenues, and 
it uses various allocation assumptions to determine what proportion on average is paid by 
business in each state. These allocated business tax payments are then divided by various 
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denominators to yield business tax rates. For the comparison, I use their business taxes divided 
by private sector value-added, which is similar to this database’s value-added.  
 Because of how the Ernst and Young reports are done, the tax base is an average gross 
business tax rate. It does not necessarily reflect the tax rate on new investment, but rather the 
average of firms across all ages. Therefore, for the comparisons, using this paper’s database, we 
take all 45 industries, both export-base and non-export-base, and attempt to calculate an average 
tax rate as a percentage of value-added with some assumed age allocation of firms. We use a 
similar method of allocation to what was used in Table 21 of the main text, except we assume an 
age allocation based on an assumption that overall private-sector GSP grows by 2.232 percent 
per year, with new investment depreciating by 2.491 percent per year. These figures are based on 
average private-sector gross state product growth in the United States from 1997 to 2014, 
according to the BEA, and on the average depreciation rate of structures, according to the BEA.  
 Ernst and Young’s reports include more business payments of taxes than the current 
database. The current database’s model only includes the property tax, the sales tax on business 
inputs, and property taxes. According to Ernst and Young, in 2014, these three taxes were 66.5 
percent of overall state and local business taxes. However, the Ernst and Young figures include 
unemployment insurance taxes, which may not be a business tax.   
 Table E4 reports the results. For 2003, 2014, and the difference between the two years, 
the Ernst and Young results are positively correlated with the current database’s results, with the 
correlation being statistically significant for the 2003 comparison and the 2003-to-2014 change 
in business taxes. These correlations are moderately high.  In some specific cases, the models 
agree. For example, both models agree that Michigan from 2003 to 2014 had a large reduction in 
average business taxes, while New Mexico had a large increase in average business taxes. But in  
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Table E4  Comparisons of Average Gross Business Tax Rates, Ernst and Young versus This Database 
 
Gross tax rate 
2014 (%) 
Gross tax rate 
2003 (%) 
Change in gross tax rate 
2014–2003 (%) 
state This database Ernst & Young This database Ernst & Young This database Ernst & Young 
Alabama 3.74 4.50 4.04 4.40 0.30 −0.10 
Arizona 6.06 5.30 5.23 4.90 −0.82 −0.40 
California 3.93 4.40 4.08 4.40 0.14 0.00 
Colorado 3.70 4.00 4.40 4.30 0.69 0.30 
Connecticut 6.23 4.30 6.08 3.40 −0.16 −0.90 
District of Columbia 5.47 0.00 5.11 4.80 −0.37 0.00 
Florida 4.95 5.40 4.34 5.20 −0.61 −0.20 
Georgia 3.89 4.00 4.00 3.80 0.11 −0.20 
Illinois 5.24 5.30 5.42 5.00 0.18 −0.30 
Indiana 4.80 4.10 4.36 3.70 −0.44 −0.40 
Iowa 5.45 5.00 6.04 4.50 0.59 −0.50 
Kentucky 3.65 4.70 3.42 4.70 −0.23 0.00 
Louisiana 5.52 5.80 5.10 4.00 −0.42 −1.80 
Maryland 5.10 4.30 5.37 3.80 0.27 −0.50 
Massachusetts 4.92 3.90 4.90 4.10 −0.01 0.20 
Michigan 6.20 5.30 5.55 3.70 −0.65 −1.60 
Minnesota 5.12 4.60 5.83 4.60 0.71 0.00 
Missouri 4.75 4.10 4.87 3.50 0.12 −0.60 
Nebraska 4.84 5.20 4.79 4.30 −0.05 −0.90 
Nevada 2.43 4.70 2.58 5.40 0.14 0.70 
New Jersey 4.58 5.10 4.32 5.10 −0.25 0.00 
New Mexico 6.93 5.90 7.74 7.00 0.81 1.10 
New York 5.71 5.60 5.08 5.70 −0.63 0.10 
North Carolina 3.56 3.70 3.52 3.50 −0.04 −0.20 
Ohio 4.81 4.70 3.82 4.10 −0.99 −0.60 
Oregon 3.46 3.40 3.76 3.40 0.30 0.00 
Pennsylvania 4.74 4.70 5.67 4.50 0.92 −0.20 
South Carolina 4.72 4.50 5.41 4.90 0.68 0.40 
Tennessee 5.40 4.50 5.95 4.20 0.56 −0.30 
Texas 5.39 5.10 4.95 4.90 −0.44 −0.20 
Virginia 3.58 3.90 2.96 3.80 −0.61 −0.10 
Washington 4.67 6.30 4.86 5.40 0.19 −0.90 
Wisconsin 5.34 4.90 4.90 4.50 −0.44 −0.40 
       
Correlation  0.553  0.318  0.418 
NOTE: Ernst and Young numbers report average overall business tax rate as percentage of private value-added. This database 
reports overall average gross business tax rate on 45 industries, comprising 75% of value-added and over 90% of employment, as 
a percentage of value-added, averaged using an assumed age distribution of firms.  The correlation is between the above two 
columns. Bolded correlations are statistically significantly different from zero at a 95% level.  
SOURCE: Author’s calculations, Cline et al. (2004), Phillips et al. (2015). 
 
 
other cases there is disagreement. For example, the Ernst and Young model says there were large 
business tax reductions from 2003 to 2014 in Washington, Nebraska, and Connecticut, which are 
not evidenced in this database’s results.  Presumably these differences in part reflect the quite 
distinct methodologies and data sources used in these two different models.  
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Ernst and Young Breakdown of Types of Business Taxes 
 I wanted to check how similar the allocation of types of business taxes in the current 
database was to Ernst and Young’s allocation. To make these as comparable as possible, the 
average taxes from this study were weighted using an assumed distribution of ages of firms. In 
addition, in the Ernst and Young calculations, individual income taxes were also included. Our 
database implicitly acts as if the corporate income tax applies to all firms. The Ernst and Young 
figures for business taxes include property taxes and sales taxes on business inputs paid by firms 
that end up having their profits taxed under the individual income tax. Therefore, to make the 
allocation by type of tax comparable, individual income taxes in the Ernst and Young figures 
need to be added in to the “income tax” category.  
 Table E5 reports the results. Once the adjustments are made to boost comparability, the 
allocation of business taxes by type of tax is remarkably similar in this database and in Ernst and 
Young’s analysis.  
 
Table E5  Allocation of State and Local Business Taxes by Type of Tax among Property, Sales, and Income 
Taxes, This Database versus Ernst and Young 
 This database Ernst and Young 
Property 52.5 51.0 
Sales 24.5 29.0 
Income 23.0 20.0 
NOTE: This database’s results are for 2014 and are for export-base firms. The allocation of taxes by type of tax are based on 
results that weight effects in different years of an investment by an assumed allocation of firms by age of firm. Ernst and Young’s 
results are for 2014 and come from Phillips et al. (2015). These results add individual income taxes paid by business to the 
corporate income tax total and divide by the three-tax-type total to get the percentages.  
SOURCE: Author’s calculations, Phillips et al. (2015). 
 
 
 On the other hand, the trends over time in this database differ from the Ernst and Young 
trends. Ernst and Young has some aggregate data over the entire United States for estimated state 
and local business taxes by type going back to the year 2000. As shown in Table E6, their 
analysis finds that from 2000 to 2014, property taxes and income taxes increased their share of 
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Table E6  Comparison of Time Trends in Type of Tax between This Database and Ernst and Young 
 Ernst and Young This database 
Share of: 2000 2014 2014–2000 2000 2014 2014–2000 
Property tax  48.3 51.0 2.7 54.0 52.5 −1.5 
Sales tax 33.4 29.0 –4.4 19.6 24.5 4.9 
Income taxes 18.4 20.0 1.6 26.3 23.0 –3.4 
NOTE: This database results are for export-base firms. The weighing looks at each age of investment, and weights those ages by 
an assumed age distribution of firms. The Ernst and Young results add in their business income taxed under the individual 
income tax to their corporate income tax figures. The 2014-2000 columns shows the difference of the 2014 column minus the 
2000 column.  
SOURCE: Author’s calculations; Cline et al. (2004); Phillips et al. (2015). 
 
 
state and local business taxes, while sales taxes decreased. In contrast, this database suggests that 
the share of sales taxes increased, while the shares of property taxes and income taxes decreased. 
The divergent income tax trends could be due in part to the growth of pass-through income taxed 
under the personal income tax. But the property tax and sales tax results may result from 
divergent assumptions and data sources.  
“Good Jobs First” Megadeals 
 Good Jobs First has a database that reports “Megadeals.” These are incentive deals whose 
total value (undiscounted), over the life of the project, exceeds $75 million in nominal dollars. 
This database is available from 1990 to the present.  
 I wanted to see whether the time pattern by year in the current database matched the time 
pattern shown in the Megadeals database. To make the two data sets more comparable, I 
calculated real Megadeals as a percentage of real GDP for each year from 1990 to 2015 and 
looked at how this compares with the incentives to value-added ratio for each year, for export-
base firms, calculated in the current database.  
 Table E7 reports the results. First, I want to note the average level of Megadeals over this 
time period versus the average level of total business incentives in this database’s models. Over 
the entire time period, when both incentives and value-added are expressed as a percentage of 
GDP, Megadeals are no more than 10 percent of total incentives. The true percentage might be  
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Table E7  Time Trends in Real Megadeal Volume Compared with Time Trends in This Database’s Incentives 
to GDP Volume 
Year 
Real Megadeals 
as % of Real GDP 
Incentive/value-added (%) 
1990 0.003 0.46 
1991 0.020 0.47 
1992 0.004 0.52 
1993 0.017 0.56 
1994 0.010 0.64 
1995 0.014 0.75 
1996 0.009 0.82 
1997 0.014 0.85 
1998 0.007 0.89 
1999 0.015 0.90 
2000 0.032 1.01 
2001 0.004 1.39 
2002 0.018 1.38 
2003 0.048 1.43 
2004 0.028 1.50 
2005 0.019 1.48 
2006 0.025 1.48 
2007 0.063 1.44 
2008 0.025 1.42 
2009 0.052 1.45 
2010 0.050 1.37 
2011 0.029 1.41 
2012 0.040 1.40 
2013 0.103 1.40 
2014 0.051 1.43 
2015 0.027 1.42 
   
Average, 1990 to 2015 0.028 1.126 
Average, 1990 to 2015,  
 adjusted to GDP base 
0.028 0.330 
Correlation between Real 
Megadeal and Incentive  
0.559  
NOTE: Real Megadeal volume taken from Good Jobs First website at http://www.goodjobsfirst.org/megadeals. Real GDP from 
BEA. The adjustment of incentives as a percentage of GDP is based on 2011 figures for value-added in export-base industries 
versus total GDP. 
SOURCE: Author’s calculations, Good Jobs First. 
 
 
somewhat less because the Megadeal database does not apply any inflation adjustment or 
discounting to determine the value of Megadeals. Therefore, there is nothing that inevitably 
forces the time trends in Megadeals and incentives to be identical. 
 Second, over the entire time period, both Megadeals and the current incentives database 
show strong upward trends. The overall correlation of the two data series is 0.559 and is 
statistically significantly different from zero.  
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 Third, it is clear that the Megadeals database does not show the same slowdown in 
growth in recent years that is seen in this incentives database. Although the Megadeals fluctuate 
up and down, and some recent years are similar to some years 10 or 15 years ago, on the whole 
there appears to be some increasing trend in real Megadeals as a percentage of the economy.  
 There could be several explanations of these divergent patterns. First, over time, 
Megadeals could be becoming a greater percentage of overall incentives. Second, the database 
may not capture some of the incentives in these Megadeals, as many of these Megadeal 
incentives are discretionary and handed out in an ad hoc and project-specific manner that would 
not be captured in the incentives database. Third, the Megadeals database may have some bias 
toward finding larger dollar volumes more recently, for at least two reasons: 1) the $75 million 
threshold is not adjusted for inflation, so more deals today would be covered, and 2) there has 
been some improvement in incentive reporting over time, which may allow more Megadeals to 
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APPENDIX F:  COMPARISON OF THIS STUDY’S INCENTIVE ESTIMATES WITH 
ANNUAL INCENTIVE DOLLAR ESTIMATES FROM STATE TAX EXPENDITURE 
STUDIES AND OTHER SOURCES 
 This study estimates what state and local governments are doing in incentives using a 
simulation model. This simulation model is based on a hypothetical firm model, as well as the 
rules and laws governing incentives in the state, combined with some judgment about which 
incentives are in fact commonly used.  
 This appendix compares this database’s estimates with estimates of incentives from what 
in each state is reported, either in state tax expenditure reports, other government documents, or 
studies by independent groups. The aim is twofold: first, to see what either methodology implies 
for what might be the national total of annual resources devoted to economic development 
incentives; second, to see whether these two quite distinct estimation methods lead to a similar 
spatial pattern of incentives across states. A similar spatial pattern provides some support that 
both methods are reflecting reality.  
 Both estimates of incentives have some limitations, which might lead to either 
overstatement or understatement of incentives. The simulation model assumes, in essence, that 
each and every firm that starts up or expands in a state will receive the full array of modeled 
incentives. This is probably an exaggeration. On the other hand, the simulation model excludes 
certain important incentives, such as enterprise zones, tax increment financing, and some 
discretionary incentives whose rules and formulas cannot be calculated.  
 The estimates based on various state reports may miss some incentives that are not 
reported. On the other hand, for this exercise, I included enterprise zones, brownfield subsidies, 
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and various industry subsidies as incentives. As argued in the text, there are reasons to believe 
that these may not always be properly counted as incentives.  
 (This database did not include tax increment financing incentives (TIFs) in the reported 
numbers, for two reasons. First, as argued in the report’s main text, in some cases TIFs may not 
be an incentive, but rather a way of financing local infrastructure projects. Second, as the 
analysis proceeded, it became clear that in many states it is virtually impossible to reliably 
estimate TIF annual dollar costs. As a result, including TIFs would make the estimates much less 
comparable across states.)  
 The actual reports used for each state and more details on the estimates are provided 
below. All reported numbers were either for 2015 or, if for other years, were adjusted as best as 
could be done to a projected level in 2015, given the size of the export-base industry sector in the 
state in 2015 versus the year or years for which reports of incentive dollar volume are available.  
 The simulations from this paper’s database are meant to represent annual dollar resources 
devoted to incentives. Therefore, the incentives for each state were calculated by taking the 
average incentive to value-added ratio for each year of a facility’s operation and then weighting 
these numbers by an assumed age distribution of firms by year of facility operation. This age 
distribution was the same national age distribution used in the main report text and is described 
in Table 21.  
 The incentive estimates based on state reports initially yield a measure of incentives for 
2015 in terms of annual dollar volume by state. The incentive estimates based on this database 
yields a measure of incentives for 2015 in terms of a percentage of the state’s export-base value-
added. To allow comparisons, both sets of estimates were calculated in both dollar and 
percentage terms using estimates of the total value-added in export-base industries in the state.  
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 Table F1 shows, for each state for 2015, and under both the reports estimation method 
and the database estimation method, estimated incentive volume, in both percentage terms and 
dollar terms. The dollar figures are extremely highly correlated, at 0.908. But this is partly 
because both methods rely on the same estimates of a state’s export-base value-added.  However, 
the incentive percentage by state, estimated by the two methods, is also very highly correlated, at 
0.743. Even though the two methods of estimating incentives are very different, the implied 
spatial pattern of incentives is similar.  
 Looking at individual states, there is considerable overlap. Consider the incentive 
percentages. Under the database simulations, the five highest incentive states (in order from top 
to bottom) are New Mexico, Tennessee, New York, Louisiana, and South Carolina. Under the 
incentive estimates based on various reports, the five highest incentive states (in order from top 
to bottom) are Louisiana, New Mexico, South Carolina, New York, and Nebraska. Four out of 
the five top states are the same in both lists. Furthermore, Nebraska is a high-incentive state in 
the database simulations as well, and Tennessee is at least an above-average incentive state in the 
estimates based on reports.   
 Both sets of estimates can be used to project the total annual incentive dollar volume in 
the nation. The state estimates based on reports are based on only 32 states. (Alabama has no tax 
expenditure reports, so it is omitted.) The state estimates based on the database are available for 
33 states. In either case, the value-added in export-base industry value-added in these 32 or 33 
states is over 90 percent of national value-added in such industries. If we project these numbers 
up to the national level, the database estimates suggest that dollar resources in the nation devoted 
to state and local incentives in 2015 was around $45 billion. Based on the estimates from state 
reports, total resources in the nation devoted to state and local incentives in  
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Table F1  Actual Reported versus Database Simulated Annual Resources Devoted to Incentives, by State, and 











from this database 
(%) 
Annual dollar resources 
devoted to incentives from 
tax expenditure reports and 
other reports ($M) 
Annual dollar resources 
devoted to incentives 
from this database and 
export-base size ($M) 
Alabama 59,449  1.48  879 
Arizona 68,130 0.23 0.66 155 449 
California 706,254 0.36 0.41 2,559 2,864 
Colorado 97,206 0.03 0.40 26 390 
Connecticut 93,385 0.31 0.33 289 305 
District of Columbia 26,075 0.55 0.91 143 238 
Florida 192,467 0.54 0.99 1,033 1,902 
Georgia 144,345 0.34 0.26 484 376 
Illinois 245,615 0.39 0.91 956 2,234 
Indiana 133,110 0.38 1.55 507 2,069 
Iowa 58,063 0.32 1.38 186 801 
Kentucky 59,632 0.38 1.26 226 754 
Louisiana 78,428 1.89 1.85 1,484 1,452 
Maryland 87,689 0.14 0.26 119 227 
Massachusetts 164,208 0.29 0.37 475 611 
Michigan 164,376 0.54 1.05 883 1,721 
Minnesota 106,264 0.14 0.58 146 621 
Missouri 87,558 0.21 0.37 185 323 
Nebraska 31,435 0.64 1.33 200 419 
Nevada 39,000 0.01 0.12 4 48 
New Jersey 173,932 0.24 1.64 425 2,848 
New Mexico 16,968 1.66 3.01 281 511 
New York 440,200 1.12 1.87 4,942 8,250 
North Carolina 174,442 0.16 0.56 278 972 
Ohio 196,119 0.27 0.56 526 1,105 
Oregon 86,398 0.42 0.37 359 323 
Pennsylvania 219,837 0.16 0.86 346 1,881 
South Carolina 56,514 1.14 1.84 645 1,037 
Tennessee 93,446 0.57 2.74 530 2,563 
Texas 482,772 0.32 0.64 1,554 3,097 
Virginia 144,772 0.10 0.12 144 173 
Washington 152,751 0.08 0.05 121 74 
Wisconsin 103,923 0.25 0.75 258 777 
Correlation of reported w/database 0.743   0.908 
      
Sum of 32 states 4,925,313 0.42 0.84 20,470 41,415 
National total 5,328,586 0.42 0.84 22,146 44,806 
 32 as % of national 92.4     
Sum of 33 states 4,984,763  0.85  42,294 
National total 5,328,586  0.85  45,211 
 33 as % of national  93.5     
NOTE: All dollar figures are in millions of 2015 dollars. The correlation is across the 32 states, and is the correlation of the 
percentages under each method, and dollars by state under each method. The bolding indicates these correlations are statistically 
significant.  The export-base value-added figures come from the BEA and are value-added figures for the 31 export-base 
industries, projected to the year 2015 using available data through 2014. The tax expenditure reports and other reports by state are 
used to generate the annual dollar total for the 32 states with tax expenditure reports of some kind, as described further in the 
appendix text. Division then yields the percentage that incentives are of value-added of export-base industries in the state. For this 
database, the model is used to project the annual resources devoted to economic development under the assumption that the 2015 
incentive regime is applied to an assumed distribution of facilities by age of facility. The annual dollar resources from the database 
are then derived by multiplying by export-base industry value-added. The national totals are calculated by assuming that the same 
percentages in the 32 states apply to the entire nation, and then multiplying these percentages by national value-added in export-
base industries to get annual dollar figures.  
SOURCE: Author’s calculations, various tax expenditures, and other reports cited in appendix. 
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2015 were around $22 billion. I would regard the $22 billion as a minimum figure; state and 
local reports often omit incentives. Total incentives could be even higher than $45 billion, 
because the database estimation method may also omit some incentives.  
 Below, this appendix describes the methods used in this appendix, based on the various e 
reports’ numbers, to generate this appendix’s incentive estimates:   
General Comments 
 For each state, this appendix tries to measure all state and local business tax incentives 
and business non–tax incentives for as close a year to 2015 as possible. All incentives are 
included, except that sales tax breaks are, in general, not included. For all incentives, this 
appendix tries to measure the annual cost of each incentive program. This significantly 
understates expected long-term costs of recently started incentive programs, or recently 
expanded incentive programs, that promise long-term incentives.  Major examples of such 
possible understatements are mentioned in the below discussion. Each incentive included is then 
divided by actual or projected value-added for 31 export-base industries in that year, or if the 
number is cumulated over several years, for those several years. This is based on BEA Regional 
Economic Information System (REIS) data on gross state product (GSP) by industry, 1997–
2013, and GSP total data for 2014. The 2013 31-industry total is projected to 2014 assuming the 
export-base share stays the same. For 2015 through 2017, totals for 31 industries are projected 
based on the 2013–2014 GDP growth rate continuing. For each incentive, this percentage of 
value-added is then added up to get overall percentage of value-added for all incentives. The 
dollar figure for 2015 that is produced in the table is then estimated by multiplying this total 
percentage by the estimated 2015 total of value-added for export-base industries in that state. 
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Alabama 
 Because Alabama does not currently have a tax expenditure report, no attempt was made 
to measure actual economic development incentives in that state.  
Arizona 
 Tax expenditure data for 2013 (total of $121.8 million) on enterprise zones, new 
employment tax credit, motion pictures credit, research and development tax credit, and other 
miscellaneous credits, come from The Revenue Impact of Arizona’s Tax Expenditures 2014/15, 
produced by the Arizona Department of  Revenue: 
https://www.azdor.gov/Portals/0/TaxExpenditures/FY15%20AZPreliminaryTaxExpenditureRep
ort.pdf. 
 Data on Arizona Competes fund actual payments from FY 2012 through FY 2015 ($17.7 
million) come from Arizona Competes Fund: Annual Report, 2015, produced by the Arizona 
Commerce Authority: 
https://d35uq38u77mscr.cloudfront.net/media/1063675/ACF_AnnualReport_FY15_110315.pdf. 
Note that the annual amount is likely to escalate over time as payments from earlier years 
increase.  
 Job training grants of $31.8 million for 2014 and 2015 are taken from a published list of 
job training grants from the Arizona Department of Commerce, at 
https://d35uq38u77mscr.cloudfront.net/media/1091259/Website-Grants-2616.pdf. 
California 
 Tax expenditure data for 2015 (total of $2,472 million) for R&D credit, enterprise zones, 
accelerated depreciation for research and development, film credit, California Competes credit, 
hiring credit, and jobs tax credit, come from the California Department of Finance, Tax 
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Expenditure Report, 2015-16. http://www.dof.ca.gov/research/economic-
financial/documents/2015-16_TE_Report_revised_01_15.pdf.   Data on customized job training 
grants of $91 million for 2016 are taken from the website of the California Employment Training 
Panel at https://www.etp.ca.gov/fund_limitations.cfm.  Information on California Competes 
annual credits, in 2016 and subsequent years, is from the website of the Governor’s Office of 
Business and Economic Development, California Competes Tax Credit: Frequently Asked 
Questions, at  
http://www.business.ca.gov/Portals/0/CA%20Competes/Docs/California%20Competes%20FAQ
%203-02-2016.pdf. This credit will eventually escalate toward $200 million per year, although 
this is not counted in analyses done here.  
Colorado 
 Tax expenditure data for 2011 for investment tax credit and enterprise zones of $11.7 
million are taken from the Colorado Department of Revenue, Colorado Tax Profile and 
Expenditure Report 2012, https://www.colorado.gov/pacific/sites/default/files/2012.pdf.  Job 
growth incentive tax credit actual payments authorized in 2015 of $6.4 million are reported in the 
Colorado Economic Development Commission’s 2015 Annual Report, 
http://www.advancecolorado.com/sites/default/files/Incentives/2015_Annual_Reports/EDCAnnu
alReport2015.pdf. Additional promises of $195.7 million were made in 2015, so this amount is 
likely to considerably increase over time. This report also lists additional payments on various 
incentive programs of $1.0 million, with total incentives promised of $18.1 million, so these 
incentives too will increase over time. Customized job training of $4.5 million for 2016 is from 
the Colorado Office of Economic Development and International Trade, Colorado First/Existing 
Industry Customized Job Training Fact Sheet, at 
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 Tax expenditure data reported on a biennial basis lists tax expenditures of $231.4 million 
in 2016, which includes capital investment expenditures, property tax breaks for electronic data 
processing, film incentives, R&D credits, and enterprise zone credits.   Data from the Office of 
Fiscal Analysis, Connecticut General Assembly, Tax Expenditure Report: February 2016, 
https://www.cga.ct.gov/ofa/Documents/year/TER/2016TER-
20160201_Tax%20Expenditure%20Report%20FY%2016.pdf. 
 Property tax abatements for general manufacturing are listed as $47.9 million in 2011. 
Enterprise zone tax abatements are listed as $11.6 million in 2013. Figures on both of these are 
found in the publication from the Department of Economic and Community Development, State 
of Connecticut, An Assessment of Connecticut’s Tax Credit and Abatement Programs 
(September 2014), 
http://www.ct.gov/ecd/lib/ecd/decd_sb_501_sec_27_report_revised_2013_final.pdf.  
District of Columbia 
 Tax expenditure data reported here comes from the Office of Revenue Analysis, District 
of Columbia, District of Columbia Tax Expenditure Report (May 2014), 
http://cfo.dc.gov/sites/default/files/dc/sites/ocfo/publication/attachments/2014%20Tax%20Expen
diture%20Report_0.pdf.  The data are for Fiscal Year 2015, and they total $142.9 million in tax 
expenditure, mostly in the form of property tax breaks for high-tech businesses, commercial 
businesses, and insurance companies. The largest category is miscellaneous property tax 
exemptions, which may include some noneconomic development purposes.  
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Florida 
 Both tax expenditure data and tourism and other industry promotional data are found for 
2015 in the Florida Tax Handbook (2014 edition), 
http://edr.state.fl.us/content/revenues/reports/tax-handbook/taxhandbook2014.pdf.  
 The 2015 and 2016 editions are also consulted to update a few numbers to 2015 levels. 
The bulk of these incentives are expenditures from special taxes to promote tourism/sports 
stadiums and convention centers, which together account for $849 million in 2015. There also 
are a variety of other programs, mostly various tax expenditures (including local property tax 
abatements), which total $90 million. In addition, the state has a number of cash grants, which 
total $75.4 million in actual spending in 2015. Of this, the bulk was from the Quick Closing 
Fund ($47 million) and the Transportation Infrastructure Fund ($20 million). Information on 
these incentives is found in the Florida Department of Economic Opportunity’s 2015 Annual 
Incentives Report, http://floridajobs.org/docs/default-source/reports-and-
legislation/2015_annual_incentivesreport_123015.pdf. This report also suggests that these 
various grants and tax incentives are close to “maturity,” in that the programs have been around 
long enough that annual payments are similar to annual approvals. Information on customized 




 Information on tax expenditures for 2015 for various investment tax credits, jobs tax 
credits, films credit, research credits, and employer retraining credits come from the Fiscal 
Research Center of the Andrew Young School of Policy Studies at Georgia State University, 
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Georgia Tax Expenditure Report for FY 2017 (December 2015), 
https://opb.georgia.gov/sites/opb.georgia.gov/files/related_files/site_page/TER%202017%20Fina
l%20Deliverable%20-Second%20Version-12-14-2015.pdf. The total is $430 million, of which 
$243 million is made up of film credits. Information on $41 million in deal-closing-fund 
spending on economic development projects in 2015 is taken from the Georgia Budget and 
Policy Institute, Overview: 2015 Fiscal Year Budget for Business Subsidies (January 2014),  
http://gbpi.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/Overview-2015-Fiscal-Year-Budget-for-Business-
Subsidies2.pdf.  Information on $12.7 million in the Quick Start program’s spending in 2014 on 
customized job training is taken from the Georgia Budget and Policy Institute, Overview of 
Georgia’s Fiscal 2014 Budget for Higher Ed, http://gbpi.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/02/fy2014_Budget-Analysis_Ed_higher-ed_2.pdf.  
Illinois 
 The most recent information on tax expenditures is from FY 2014, which comes from the 
Illinois Comptroller, Tax Expenditure Report: Illinois, Fiscal Year 2014. This report lists $611.4 
million in state economic development tax credits (p. 7). However, many of them are sales tax 
exemptions, which in general are not treated in this paper as economic development incentives. 
For calculating incentives, this paper excludes $223.2 million in sales tax exemptions for various 
business purchases. The exception is that this paper includes the manufacturer’s purchase credit, 
which is a credit on tax-exempt purchases of machinery and equipment, taken against other sales 
taxes, and amounts to $49 million. The remaining total of state economic development tax 
credits is $388.2 million. In addition, the report lists an investment tax credit of $56.1 million in 
FY 2012 which affects local government revenue from the state (p. 7). This paper also attempts 
to calculate property tax relief provided to industrial and commercial property in Cook County 
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for the purpose of providing special relief for new investments from a higher classification rate 
for such property. From the Illinois Department of Revenue website I get 2014 data on total 
Cook County property taxes ($11.735 billion, Table A) and the percentage that is commercial 
and industrial (38.7 percent, Table 15), 
http://www.revenue.state.il.us/AboutIdor/TaxStats/PropertyTaxStats/2014/, from which 
commercial and industrial property taxes can be calculated. In the Chicago Metropolitan Agency 
for Planning publication Examination of Local Economic Development Incentives in 
Northeastern Illinois (August 2013), it is reported that 5.8 percent of all commercial/industrial 
property in Cook County as of 2011 received this special lower property tax classification (p. 4).  
(If anything, the percentage would be higher in 2014 or 2015.) This means this property is 
assessed at 10 percent rather than 25 percent, which means the incentive for this property class is 
equal to 1.5 times their actual property tax bill. Multiplying 11.735 billion times 38.7 percent 
times 5.8 percent times 1.5 yields an estimated incentive value in 2014 of $395.1 million, 
http://www.cmap.illinois.gov/documents/10180/82875/FY14-
0009+LOCAL+ECONOMIC+INCENTIVES+REPORT.pdf/51b8f555-4579-42df-8667-
87587fcc14f1. The State of Illinois, Department of Commerce and Economic Opportunity, in its 
Illinois Workforce Development Fpy’14/Sfy’15 Annual Report, has estimates that customized job 
training was $13 million in 
2014,https://www.doleta.gov/Performance/Results/AnnualReports/PY2014/IL.pdf. In the 
Department of Revenue, State of Illinois, Memorandum on FY2013 Economic Development 
Unified Budget, it is reported that FY2015 Department of Transportation Expenditures on 
economic development transportation infrastructure (e.g., access roads) totaled 26.1 million in 
Fiscal Year 2015, 
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http://www.revenue.state.il.us/AboutIdor/TaxStats/AnnualUnified/UnifiedBudget2013.pdf. The 
Illinois Department in Revenue reports that for 2013 property taxes, general abatements for 
commercial and industrial property totaled $5.7 million (Table 26). Enterprise zone abatements 
totaled $39.7 million in 2013.  
http://www.revenue.state.il.us/AboutIdor/TaxStats/PropertyTaxStats/2013/. 
Indiana 
 Information on many regular state and local  tax breaks is taken from the 2014 tax 
incentive report of the Indiana Legislative Services Agency, Indiana Tax Incentive Review, 
https://iga.in.gov/static-documents/0/b/0/8/0b08377d/indiana_tax_incentive_review_2014_ 
annual_report.pdf. Included are various enterprise zone credits, research expense credits, EDGE 
credits, the Hoosier Business Investment Credit, and other miscellaneous business incentives.  
These tax incentive amounts are generally for FY 2016. Included are $25.9 million in incentives 
under the individual income tax (Appendix 3), $151.1 million in incentives under the corporate 
income tax (Appendix 4), $44.9 million in other miscellaneous incentives (Appendix 6), and 
$6.2 million in local revenue loss from other tax incentive provisions (Appendix 8).  The total for 
FY 2016 is $228.1 million. Note that the estimated cost of the EDGE program was $72 million 
in FY 2016. In 2015, Indiana agreed to new EDGE contracts whose incentives totaled $198 
million, so clearly over time this program activity will increase unless most of these incented 
jobs are never created. (Figures on EDGE contracts are derived from an online transparency 
portal of the Indiana Economic Development Council at 
https://transparency.iedc.in.gov/Pages/ContractSearch.aspx.) Similarly, the estimated cost of the 
Hoosier Business Investment Credit, according to ILSA, was expected to be $8.4 million in FY 
2016, yet the new contracts for HBIC in 2015 totaled $28 million. The IEDC transparency portal 
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also reports activity over the past several years for several other grant programs, the most 
important of which is the Skill Enhancement Fund. Unfortunately, it only reports the original 
contract plus the amount paid out up to the present. Looking at the time pattern of contracts 
awarded versus grants paid from 2012 to 2015, it seems likely that in 2015 at least $13.3 million 
in SEF contracts were paid out (20.0 in new contracts were written in 2015). In addition, it 
appears that $1.7 million in SBIR contracts were probably paid out in 2015,  
https://iga.in.gov/legislative/2016/publications/tax_incentive_review/#document-0b08377d.  
Property tax abatements are estimated at $253 million in 2013 by Faulk and Hicks (2013), “An 
Analysis of State and Local Tax Incentives in Indiana,” available at 
http://projects.cberdata.org/reports/IEDC-TaxIncentives-2013Nov21-web.pdf.  
Iowa 
 The state business tax credit estimate for 2015 of $178 million is taken from Peter 
Fisher’s report for the Iowa Fiscal Partnership, “Here a Tax Break, There a Tax Break, 
Everywhere a Tax Break,” January 2016, http://www.iowafiscal.org/here-a-tax-break-there-a-
tax-break-everywhere-a-tax-break/.  It looks as if 2015 was actually an unusually small year for 
Iowa state tax breaks, as business tax breaks in that year were roughly at the same level they had 
been since 2008 in nominal terms, and tax breaks are expected to grow to $273 million in 2017 
and $295 million in 2018, based on the Iowa Department of Revenue, Table 9, Contingent 
Liabilities Report, December 2015, 
https://tax.iowa.gov/sites/files/idr/Contingent%20Liabilities%20Report%201215.pdf.  In 
addition, an independent perusal of the last comprehensive evaluation of tax expenditures, for the 
year 2010, suggests state business tax incentives totaled $184 million in 2010—see tax 
expenditures report and Excel worksheet available from the Iowa Department of Revenue at 
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https://tax.iowa.gov/report/Tax-Expenditures. Iowa also provides some property tax abatements. 
According to the 2010 tax expenditure report, the total exempted industrial property had a value 
of 149.3 million—see the Excel spreadsheet available at the Iowa Department of Revenue at 
https://tax.iowa.gov/report/Tax-Expenditures. This paper assumes a property tax rate of 3.07 
percent, which yields 2010 property tax abatements of $4.6 million. (The 3.07 percent rate is 
derived from the ratio of TIF property tax revenues to TIF incremental property value for 2012, 
as reported in Anthony Girardi’s report for the Iowa Department of Revenue, Iowa Tax 
Increment Financing Tax Credits Program Evaluation Study (December 2013), available at 
https://tax.iowa.gov/sites/files/idr/TIF%20Evaluation%20Study%202013.pdf. The assumption is 
that average tax rates in tax abatement areas will be similar to average tax rates in TIF areas.) In 
addition, Iowa provides some direct grants and forgivable loans. In the Iowa Economic 
Development Authority’s Fiscal Year 2015 Annual Report, it is reported that from January 2011 
to January 2015, Iowa provided $56.6 million in direct assistance, versus tax credits of $478.1 
million, 
http://www.iowaeconomicdevelopment.com/userdocs/documents/ieda/2016_IEDAReport_BySta
tus.pdf. This appears to be based on contracts, but if we assume the payout rate for the grants and 
forgivable loans is at least as rapid as that for tax credits, the implied percentage of grants to tax 
credits is 11.8 percent. This percentage appears to be compared only to tax credits provided by 
the Iowa Quality Jobs Program. In 2015, these tax credits had a payout of $20.8 million, based 
on the previously referenced Contingent Liabilities Report. Multiplying $20.8 million by 11.8 
percent yields estimated direct assistance of $2.5 million in 2015.  
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Kentucky 
 State tax expenditures for Fiscal Year 2015 are found in the Office of State Budget 
Director, Commonwealth of Kentucky, publication Tax Expenditure Analysis, Fiscal Years 
2014-2016, 
http://osbd.ky.gov/Publications/Documents/Special%20Reports/Tax%20Expenditure%20Analysi
s%20Fiscal%20Years%202014-2016.pdf. These total $202.6 million, of which the largest 
amount is $51.8 million for the Kentucky Job Development Fund. However, other incentives 
include earmarked funds for the equine industry and the tobacco industry, and TIF credits against 
state taxes. The state also allows local property tax abatements. These are not directly reported. 
However, based on data on average combined local millages, and average property tax relief 
from the state property tax for projects financed by IRBs, the estimated amount of local property 
tax abatements in 2015 is $30.6 million. (This combines data from the state tax expenditure 
analysis referenced above, which pegs state property tax relief for IRB projects at $2.6 million 
annually, with information from the Kentucky Department of Revenue, Property Tax Rates 
2015, which calculates that IRB areas lower the state rate by 10.7 cents per $100, whereas the 
average combined property tax rate locally is 125.8 cents per $100.) 
http://revenue.ky.gov/NR/rdonlyres/9FBE2D86-8D63-4542-8A09-
761C48B60901/0/2015TaxRateBook.pdf. The state also provides grants and forgivable loans. 
The latest information on actual spending on this program indicates spending in 2010 of $10.2 
million (see Anderson Economic Group, Review of Kentucky’s Economic Development 
Incentives, 2012, at http://www.andersoneconomicgroup.com/portals/0/upload/ 
aeg%20ky%20incentive%20report_jun112012.pdf). It also seems likely that local areas provide 
tens of millions or even hundreds of millions dollars annually in revenue for local tax increment 
financing districts. Such TIF credits are not included in our incentive totals. 
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Louisiana 
 State tax expenditure data for 2015 or 2014 are reported in the Louisiana Department of 
Revenue’s publication Tax Exemption Budget 2014-2015, 2015, 
http://revenue.louisiana.gov/Publications/ TEB(2014-2015).pdf. For tax incentives subject to 
contracts, the report cites a figure of $454.2 million for 2014. A huge amount of this is made up 
of subsidies for films, which total $250.4 million. However, other significant incentives include 
$55.8 million for the Quality Jobs program and $56.5 million for enterprise zones. In addition, 
for the following year, 2015, other tax exemptions that should be regarded as business incentives 
total $40.8 million. The most important such incentives amount to $28.2 million for 
rehabilitation of buildings in downtowns and cultural districts. Louisiana authorizes industrial tax 
incentives of 10 years. Good Jobs First estimates the annual cost of such incentives at $977 
million in 2012 at their Accountable USA website http://www.goodjobsfirst.org/states/louisiana. 
They do not explain how this number is derived; however, it seems roughly consistent with other 
data. The state of Louisiana reports approved property tax exemptions over the 10-year period 
for this program at the website http://www.opportunitylouisiana.com/boards-reports-and-
rules/performance-reporting. From totaling all incentive approvals in the seven-year period from 
2008 to 2014 for the 10-year ITE program, the 10-year total value of tax exemptions granted is 
reported as $10,001 million. Dividing by 10 implies that each year would have a forgone tax 
amount of $1,000 million, or $1 billion. But this omits three years of exemption approvals from 
the calculation. If these three years had an average annual award level similar to the seven 
reported years, annual average exemptions would be $1,428 million. However, some of these 
projects will not occur. A $977 million level implies that a little over two-thirds of the planned 
industrial property developments actually occur, which seems reasonable. In addition, a recent 
state tax reform report for Louisiana reports that “the reduction of the property tax base from the 
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industrial tax exemption program is approximately the same size as the homestead exemption in 
terms of reducing the tax base” (see p. 10 of Jim Richardson, Steven Sheffrin, and James Alm, 
Executive Summary, Louisiana Tax Study, 2015, http://murphy.tulane.edu/files/programs/ 
Executive_Summary_Presentation_copy.pdf). The Louisiana Tax Commission, Annual Reports 
2015 
(http://www.latax.state.la.us/Menu_AnnualReports/UploadedFiles/Annual%20Report%202015.p
df), reports that annual forgone revenue from the homestead tax exemption is $771.8 million. For 
this paper, the $977 million figure is used. Customized job training figures for 2015 were derived 
from the Center for Community Economic Research (C2ER) database on state economic 
development expenditures, at http://www.stateexpenditures.org/. This in turn reflects spending 
on a fast-start training program for new and expanding facilities, on page 7 of the annual budget 




 Maryland tax expenditure statistics for 2015 are provided in the Maryland Department of 
Management and Budget’s report, Maryland Tax Expenditures Report Fiscal Year 2016, 
http://dbm.maryland.gov/budget/Documents/operbudget/FY2016TaxExpendituresReport.pdf. 
These total $68.5 million. Prominent incentives include $30.1 million for various R&D and 
biotech tax credits, $14.7 million for various enterprise zone tax credits, and $7.5 million for 
various film credits. In addition, the report says that local income tax credits are estimated as 
being 62 percent of the state credits. Because state credits total $14.3 million, estimated local 
income tax credits are $8.9 million. In addition, the state report only lists state enterprise zone 
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tax credits. Local enterprise zone property tax credits are estimated at $27.8 million. This is 
based on information in the Maryland Department of Assessments and Taxation’s Seventieth 
Annual Report, 2014, http://dat.maryland.gov/Documents/statistics/AnnualRpt_2014.pdf. This 
report states that the state provides local areas with reimbursement for half the cost of these local 
credits, at a cost in 2014 of $13.9 million. The Maryland Economic Development Assistance 
Authority and Fund provides grants and loans to various economic development projects. For 
2015, the programs expenditures exceeded loan repayments and other income, excluding general 
fund appropriations, by $13.2 million. $7.4 million in appropriations were made that year, but 
the balance in the fund declined.. For this paper, $13.2 million was assigned as the annual 
subsidy cost of this program. For this budget information, see p. III-557 of the State of 
Maryland’s Fiscal Year 2016 Proposed Budget at 
http://dbm.maryland.gov/budget/Pages/operbudget/FY2016OperatingBudgetDocs.aspx.  Tax 
increment financing revenue is estimated at $82.7 million. This is based on the Maryland 
Department of Legislative Services’ Fiscal Policy Note on SB 455, 2016 session 
(http://mgaleg.maryland.gov/2016RS/fnotes/bil_0005/sb0455.pdf), which reports that tax-
incremented property value totaled $6.7 billion. The Maryland Department of Assessments and 
Taxation Report referenced above reports that total assessed value of property is $662.7 billion 
as of 2013. The Census Bureau reports total local property tax revenue in Maryland of $8,177 
million in 2013,  
http://www.census.gov/govs/local/. The $82.7 million estimate is derived by multiplying the 
percentage that TIF assessments make up of total assessments times total Maryland local 
property tax revenues. Such TIF costs are not included in our incentive totals. 
APPENDICES TO: A New Panel Database 
on Business Incentives for Economic Development 
 
 W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research F-19 
 
Massachusetts 
 The state’s tax expenditures for 2015 are listed in the Executive Office for 
Administration and Finance, Commonwealth of Massachusetts, TAX EXPENDITURE BUDGET: 
Fiscal Year 2015, http://www.mass.gov/dor/docs/dor/stats/teb/teb2015.pdf.  For 2015, these 
expenditures total $483.8 million, of which the major components include $188.9 for research 
credits, $90.0 million for film credits, $66.1 million for investment tax credits, $45.2 million for 
brownfield redevelopment, and $45 million for rehabilitation of historic buildings by businesses.  
According to data from C2ER, Massachusetts’s customized job training budget totaled $0.9 
million in 2015, http://members.c2er.org/expenditure.asp.  
Michigan  
 State and local tax expenditures for 2015 are listed in the Michigan Department of 
Treasury’s Executive Budget Appendix on Tax Credits, Deductions, and Exemptions: Fiscal 
Years 2015 and 2016, https://www.michigan.gov/documents/treasury/ 
ExecBudgAppenTaxCreditsDedExempts_FY_20152016_476553_7.pdf. The total is $834.4 
million. Of that total, the largest incentive is actually legacy credits such as MEGA that have 
now been abolished, which total $480 million. Another large credit is $233.4 million for 
industrial property tax abatements. Other important credits include $88 million for Renaissance 
Zones and $28 million for brownfield redevelopment. The newer Michigan Business 
Development Program does not directly report annual spending. However, from the amount 
authorized each year from 2012 to 2015 and the amount actually paid out by year of the original 
grant, the likely annual spending on this credit is $54.4 million in 2015. This is based on 
assumed spending of 3 percent of commitments during the year the commitment was made, the 
first year, 45 percent in the second year, and 19 percent in the third year, with no spending 
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thereafter, and spending commitments of $58 million in 2015, $87 million in 2014, and $73 
million in 2013. These spending patterns are based on spending by the end of 2014 on 
commitments made during the previous three years. This data combines information from the 
Fiscal Year 2014 annual report of the Michigan Business Development Program and the 2014–
2015 annual report of the Michigan Economic Development Corporation, both available at 
http://www.michiganbusiness.org/legislative-reports/#msf. The annual report of the MEDC also 
reports direct spending on film incentives of $9.5 million in Fiscal Year 2015. The economic 
development expenditures database of C2ER reports annual state spending on customized job 
training and incumbent worker training of $17.5 million in 2015.  
Minnesota 
 Tax expenditure data for 2015 is provided in a February 2014 publication of the 
Minnesota Department of Revenue, Tax Expenditure Budget: Fiscal Years 2014-2017, 
http://www.revenue.state.mn.us/research_stats/research_reports/2014/2014_tax_expenditure_lin
ks.pdf. The total of economic development tax incentives for that year is $135 million. (This 
total appears conservative. The February 2016 update to this budget increases this amount to 
$170 million for Fiscal Year 2016, and this appears to involve increasing the Fiscal Year 2016 
estimates from their prior value, presumably because actual credit amounts exceeded what was 
expected back in 2014.) Of that $135 million, the largest contributors are $56.6 million for 
research tax credits, $35.3 million for historic rehab tax credits for businesses, and $24.4 million 
for tax credits for various zones.  For programs provided on the spending side, information is 
provided at the website of the Minnesota Department of Employment and Economic 
Development, in its annual program summaries section: http://mn.gov/deed/about/what-we-
do/agency-results/program-summaries/. 
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 The new large economic development incentive program, the Minnesota Job Creation 
Fund, handed out awards of $10.5 million in Fiscal Year 2014 and $11.65 million in Fiscal Year 
2015. However, the awards are paid only after actual job creation and investment, and they are 
paid over five years, so current annual dollars spent will be considerably less than these totals, 
and likely will be much less than long-run levels. For this paper, it is estimated that the program 
in 2015 spent about $1.7 million. (This is based on assumed spending of 3 percent of the Fiscal 
Year 2015 awards, and 13 percent of the Fiscal Year 2014 awards, during Calendar Year 2015.) 
In addition, the program summary website reports 2015 spending of $7.8 million on various 
incumbent worker training programs and $1.4 million on grants for small business investments.   
Missouri  
 The best recent data on incentives awarded by the State of Missouri is in a required report 
released by the Missouri Department of Economic Development, Tax Credit Accountability 
Report, https://ded.mo.gov/upload/1099Reporting2015.pdf. Despite its title, the report also 
includes other state incentives, such as customized training, that are NOT tax credits. This paper 
uses the latest report, released in June of 2015, which contains data for 2014. This report reports 
total incentives paid out during that year of $201.8 million. From that amount, this paper 
subtracted $11.6 million in Neighborhood Assistance and $10.5 million in state TIF dollars, as 
these are not treated in this paper as economic development incentives. The resulting total is 
$179.7 million. This total may significantly increase over time. The report only cites $0.8 million 
in “Missouri Works” incentives for 2014. Yet this program authorized credits of $288.8 million 
in Calendar Year 2015 ($146 million for Boeing and $142.8 million for other companies), and 
$127.9 million for such incentives were authorized in 2014. These credits are payable based on 
payroll added or “retained” over at least a five-year period, and Missouri Works only started in 
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2013, so 2014 does not represent a “permanent” level of activity for the program. Even if some 
credits are never paid, it would seem reasonable that the eventual level of activity in this program 
might be somewhere around $75 to $100 million per year. Of course, this will be partially offset 
by the disappearance of the previous main state incentive program, Missouri Quality Jobs, which 
is listed as paying out incentives of $51.2 million in 2015, even though the program has been 
replaced.  
Nebraska   
 Most of the information on Nebraska incentives comes from the Nebraska Department of 
Revenue, Nebraska Tax Incentives: 2014 Annual Report to the Nebraska Legislature, 2015, 
http://www.revenue.nebraska.gov/incentiv/annrep/14an_rep/2014_incentives_annual_report_FI
NAL.pdf. This report projects that the 2015 payout for the investment tax credits and job 
creation tax credits provided by the state’s current main economic development program 
(Nebraska Advantage) and its former main program (Employment and Investment Growth Act, 
or LB775) will total $166.7 million in 2015. In addition, these two incentive programs have a 
total balance of credits earned but not yet paid of $919.4 million at the end of 2015. Not all of 
these will be paid out, as many earned credits will exhaust their carry-forward term and expire, 
but the report is anticipating that the annual payout will increase to $288.2 million by the year 
2025. In addition to these state revenue losses, these two incentive programs also provide 
personal property tax exemptions. This appendix, by combining information on personal 
property taxes exempted by county in 2014 with information on county-specific tax rates (see the 
Nebraska Department of Revenue website at  
http://www.revenue.nebraska.gov/PAD/research/valuation/avg_rates/avg_rates_by_cnty.html), 
estimates the annual personal property taxes forgone because of these exemptions at $14.8 
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million. The tax incentives report also includes information on the following tax incentives: $1 
million for the Rural Development Act (for 2013, the last year for which data are available); $0.8 
million for the Microenterprise tax incentive (also 2013 as the last year with available data); and 
$4.4 million in R&D tax credits paid in 2014. The C2ER database shows that customized job 
training incentives totaled $11.5 million in 2015.  
Nevada 
 Tax expenditure data for 2014 comes from the Nevada Department of Taxation’s 2013-
2014 Tax Expenditure Report, 2014, available at 
http://tax.nv.gov/uploadedFiles/taxnvgov/Content/TaxLibrary/Tax_Expenditure_Report_2013-
2014.pdf. The economic development–related tax expenditures for 2014 totaled $3.5 million, of 
which $3.0 million goes to a personal property tax abatement program that applies in urban areas 
primarily to very large new business investments, and only for personal property. Information on 
customized job training programs comes from the C2ER database, which reports 2016 
customized job training spending at $0.6 million.  
New Jersey 
 Tax expenditure data for 2015 is taken from the State of New Jersey’s Fiscal Year 2017 
Tax Expenditure Report, 2016, available at http://www.state.nj.us/treasury/taxation/pdf/ 
taxexpenditurereport2016.pdf. (The 2015 information is given in the report, along with estimates 
for 2016 and 2017.) The 2016 tax expenditures totaled $207.5 million, of which the largest 
portion is $103.4 million for the Urban Transit Hub program and the second-largest is $54.5 
million in research tax credits. These tax credits seem to be dramatically expanding. The FY2017 
totals for this same set of tax credits is $564.9 million. The state also had a grant program, which 
is being replaced by some of these additional tax credits. The Business Employment Incentive 
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Program, in its last year of reports, had annual spending on incentive grants in 2013 of $175 
million, as recorded in the New Jersey Economic Development Authority’s Business 
Employment Incentive Program, 2013 Annual Report, available at  
http://www.njeda.com/web/pdf/ BEIP_FY2013_AnnualReport.pdf. In addition, according to 
C2ER, New Jersey had annual spending on incumbent worker job training of $29.7 million in 
2015. It should be noted that the Incentives Database shows New Jersey’s incentives as more 
than doubling from 2013 to 2015, and this expanded incentive availability does not seem to be 
fully reflected in actual tax credits in 2015, although 2017 shows a considerable expansion.  
New Mexico 
 Information on state tax expenditures is available in the New Mexico Taxation and 
Revenue Department’s 2015 Tax Expenditure Report, available at 
http://www.tax.newmexico.gov/uploads/ 
PressRelease/e19f5d4c8b014c6d870f8073d673341b/2015_Tax_Expenditure_Report_revised.pdf
. These tax expenditures for economic development expenditures total $260.2 million in 
estimated expenditures for Fiscal Year 2015. In addition, there is $8.9 million in tax expenditures 
for which the latest data are for Fiscal Year 2014. The major tax expenditure is $69.9 million for 
the High Wages Tax Credit. There also are $93.4 million in tax credits related to various mineral 
and energy industries and $50 million in film credits.  The state also provided $11.6 million in 
customized job training in 2015, according to a report on 2015 results for the Job Training 
Incentive Program, available at https://gonm.biz//uploads/documents/programs/ 
JTIP_Companies_FY15.pdf. Local governments also provide extensive property tax abatements, 
but there appears to be no information on the size of the forgone revenue from such abatements.  
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New York 
 The information nearest to 2015 on state tax expenditures is available in the Department 
of Taxation and Finance, New York State, FY 2016 Annual Report on New York State Tax 
Expenditures, available at https://www.budget.ny.gov/pubs/archive/fy1516archive/eBudget1516/ 
fy1516ter/TaxExpenditure2015-16.pdf.  This report estimates total tax expenditures in 2015 for 
economic development at  $1,375.6 million. Of those tax expenditures, $427 million are for film 
credits, $204 million are from the expired Empire Zone program, $150 million are from the 
Excelsior Jobs program, $146.2 million are for investment tax credits, and $130 million are for 
brownfield tax credits. For property tax abatements, the most comprehensive information for 
2015 appears to be for New York City, from the City of New York, Tax Policy Division, Annual 
Report on Tax Expenditures, Fiscal Year 2015, 
https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/finance/downloads/pdf/reports/reports-tax-
expenditure/ter_2015_final.pdf. The figures used are from 2015 and add up to New York City 
tax expenditures of $2,650.2 million. These include $1,888.2 million in tax expenditures for 
property tax relief on commercial and industrial property. In addition, New York City reports 
$437 million in tax expenditures from exempting most insurance company activity from 
taxation, as well as $308 million from capping business taxes at $1 million.  Based on a report by 
the Office of the State Comptroller, Annual Performance Report on New York State’s Industrial 
Development Agencies Fiscal Year Ending 2013 (available at 
https://www.osc.state.ny.us/localgov/pubs/research/ida_reports/2015/idaperformance.pdf), 
annual industrial property tax abatements outside New York City, net of payments in lieu of 
taxes, totaled $591.2 million in 2013. (This is an update of similar estimates provided in the 
Fiscal Policy Institute’s report The Growing Budget Burden of New York’s Business Tax 
Expenditures, December 7, 2010, available at http://www.fiscalpolicy.org/ 
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FPI_GrowingBurdenOfBusinessTaxExpenditures.pdf.) The FPI report also estimates that 
commercial tax abatements outside New York City totaled $206.2 million in 2009.  
North Carolina 
 According to the database on state tax expenditures, North Carolina provided economic 
development tax expenditures in 2015 that totaled $170 million. (Available in spreadsheet form 
at http://www.dor.state.nc.us/publications/biennial.html. The publication accompanying this 
spreadsheet is the North Carolina Department of Revenue’s Biennial Tax Expenditure Report, 
2015, available at http://www.dor.state.nc.us/publications/nc_tax_expenditure_report_15.pdf. ) 
This total state tax expenditure includes $107.6 million for renewable energy property and $57.7 
million for research tax credits. In addition, the latest report suggests that the state’s Job 
Development Investment Grant (JDIG) program had disbursements in 2015 of $46.2 million. 
(See North Carolina Department of Commerce, Job Development Investment Grant, 2015 
Annual Report, available at https://www.nccommerce.com/Portals/0/Incentives/2015-JDIG-
Annual-Report.pdf.) JDIG’s costs seem likely to increase, as one projection by the state suggests 
liabilities in Fiscal Year 2017 of $73.7 million. (See JDIG Funding Study, 2016–17, available at 
https://www.nccommerce.com/Portals/0/Incentives/JDIG-Funding-Study-(3-17-16)v2.pdf.) In 
addition, local incentives provided over the four years from mid-2011 to mid-2015 for the JDIG 
program, the One North Carolina incentive program, and the Job Maintenance and Capital 
Development Fund (JMAC) totaled $46.8 million, for an annual average over these four years of 
$11.7 million. (See North Carolina Department of Commerce, Economic Development Grant 
Report, October 1, 2015, available at https://www.nccommerce.com/Portals/0/Incentives/ 
2015%20ED%20Grant%20Report%20-%20Final.pdf.) This understates actual disbursements, as 
it only includes disbursements for awards made in that time period, not awards made in prior 
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years. Over the nine-year period from 2007 to 2015, One North Carolina state grant payments 
totaled $28 million, for an average of $3.3 million per year. This excludes payments made under 
One North Carolina for projects that also received JDIG funding; the available reports do not 
seem to allow this funding to be separated. Finally, in Program Year 2014, $42.8 million in 
payments were made under an expired incentive program, the 3J program; no information is 
available on the amount of payments under this program in 2015. The 2015 funding levels were 
projected by calculating percentages for the relevant year and time periods and projecting to one-
year levels.  
Ohio 
 According to the latest annual report on state tax expenditures, Ohio annual resources in  
Fiscal Year 2015 for economic development tax expenditures totaled $225.6 million. (See Office 
of Budget and Management, Tax Expenditure Report, Fiscal Years 2016–17, available at 
http://obm.ohio.gov/Budget/operating/doc/fy-16-17/ 
State_of_Ohio_Budget_Tax_Expenditure_Report_FY-16-17.pdf.) Of that total, $113.4 million 
went to refundable job creation and retention tax credits, $64.6 million went to historic 
rehabilitation tax credits, and $26.3 million went to research tax credits. On the spending side, 
the state appropriated annually in 2014 and 2015 $129.2 million in each year for the Third 
Frontier program, which provided a variety of grants and loans to support high-technology 
development and companies.  This is proposed to increase to $169.8 million annually in the next 
two-year biennium budget.  (See http://montrosegroupllc.com/kasich-budget-proposes-31-
percent-third-frontier-funding-increase/.)  In addition, the state provided $29.4 million in 
Incumbent Worker Job Training grants in 2015 of up to $4,000 per worker, although this is 
restricted to no more than $100,000 per company, which significantly restricts the incentive 
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value of these grants. At the local level, it is reported that in 2014, $88.9 million was provided in 
local tax credits associated with the state’s enterprise zone program. (For data on both the 
Incumbent Worker Training program and enterprise zones, see Ohio Development Services 
Agency, 2015 Annual Report, available at https://development.ohio.gov/files/reports/ 
2015DEVAnnualReport.pdf.) The state also authorizes additional property tax abatements for 
industrial and commercial properties in “Community Reinvestment Areas.”  There appears to be 
no comprehensive current data available on annual forgone revenue under this tax abatement 
program. However, in a 2009 report (Ohio Department of Development, Ohio Economic 
Development Incentive Study, available at https://www.cdfa.net/cdfa/cdfaweb.nsf/ord/ 
0a0aefbda0a26bdd8825793600678216/$file/ohioincentivestudy.pdf), it is stated that over the life 
of these abatements, which last up to 15 years, total annual school district forgone property taxes 
under this program totaled $622 million. This implies annual forgone revenue of at least $41.4 
million, at least as of 2006.  
Oregon 
 According to the biannual tax expenditure report (State of Oregon, 2015–17 Tax 
Expenditure Report, available at https://www.oregon.gov/DOR/programs/gov-research/ 
Documents/full-tax-expenditure_2015-17.pdf), average tax expenditures per year during the 
2013–2015 time period were $331.5 million. Of that amount, fully $183.8 million per year went 
to the Strategic Investment Program (SIP), a property-tax abatement program that only applies to 
investments of more than $100 million. (Because of its large minimum size requirement, this 
program is not included in this paper’s incentives database.) According to Good Jobs First, this 
program was originally adopted in part to target Intel (see Good Jobs First, Accountable USA-
Oregon, available at http://www.goodjobsfirst.org/states/oregon). This SIP program is expected 
APPENDICES TO: A New Panel Database 
on Business Incentives for Economic Development 
 
 W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research F-29 
 
to expand to $260.3 million per year during the 2015–17 biennium. In addition, $87.1 million 
annually goes to business incentives for renewable energy investments, $43.4 million goes to 
mostly property tax breaks for various enterprise zone programs, $10.1 million goes to film 
incentives, and $7.2 million goes to research tax credits. (The renewable energy program has 
been phased out but still has significant expenditures as of 2013–2015.) In addition, according to 
C2ER, Oregon tax spending on various industry grants to businesses locating or expanding in 
Oregon totaled $26.7 million annual in 2014. (See C2ER and Center for Regional Economic 
Competitiveness, Business Incentives and Economic Development Expenditures: An Overview of 




 According to the state’s tax expenditure report, included in the governor’s budget 
proposal (Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 2016–17 Pennsylvania Executive Budget, available 
at http://www.budget.pa.gov/PublicationsAndReports/CommonwealthBudget/Documents/2016-
17%20Proposed%20Budget/2016-17%20Budget%20Document%20Web.pdf ), Pennsylvania’s 
state tax expenditures for economic development in Fiscal Year 2015 totaled $291.5 million. 
This included $$97.6 million in state tax exemptions from various “zone” programs, $64 million 
in tax incentives from not including manufacturing and research property in the state as part of 
the apportionment formula, $60 million in film credits, and $55 million in R&D credits. In 
addition, according to the state tax expenditure reports available from C2ER, $20 million in 2015 
was devoted to the Pennsylvania First jobs credit grant program. This amount is expected to 
more than double to $45 million in 2016.  (See Council for Community and Economic Research, 
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State Economic Development Expenditures Database, available to C2ER members at 
https://www.c2er.org/products/stateexpenditures.asp.) This same database reports $0.2 million in 
2015 spending on customized job training. In addition, none of this includes local tax 
expenditures, which seem likely to be in the hundreds of millions of dollars annually for 
industrial incentives. For example, a report by the Philadelphia comptroller suggests that local 
tax credits for just one program, the Keystone Opportunity Program, in the last year of available 
data for the program, 2012, totaled $30.7 million. (See Office of the Comptroller, An Analysis of 
the Keystone Opportunity Zone Program, 1999–2012: The Costs and Benefits to Philadelphia, 
available at http://www.philadelphiacontroller.org/publications/KOZ-Report_March2014.pdf.) 
There are many other KOZ areas in the state, and other local property tax abatement programs 
for businesses.  
South Carolina 
 A fairly comprehensive account of state incentives for economic development is provided 
by the South Carolina Revenue and Fiscal Affairs Office, Economic Development Incentives, 
available at 
http://rfa.sc.gov/files/Economic%20Development%20Incentives%20Report%202016.pdf. 
According to this report, there were a total of $380.3 million in state incentives distributed in 
Fiscal Year 2014. Of this total, $242.4 million was in tax credits and $137.8 million in budget 
spending. Large tax credits include $75.5 million for Job Development Credits, $52.0 million for 
the Jobs Tax Credit, $23.4 million for R&D tax credits, and $16 million in film credits. On the 
expenditure side, the largest single program is for the Closing Fund, which totaled $24 million in 
Fiscal Year 2014 and increased to $45.4 million in Fiscal Year 2014. In doing the calculations, 
we use Fiscal Year 2014 total incentives of $356.3 to calculate a 2014 percentage total, and we 
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use the $45.4 million updated figure for the Closing Fund to calculate a 2015 percentage total. In 
addition, the state provided $74.4 million in Fiscal Year 2017 in reimbursements to local 
governments for accelerated depreciation schedules for manufacturing property (see SC Revenue 
and Fiscal Affairs Office, Projected Property Tax Revenue by Assessment Classification and 
Reimbursements by the State for FY 2016–17, available at 
http://rfa.sc.gov/files/FY%2017%20Projected%20Property%20Tax%20and%20Reimbursements
%20%28Table%29%20website.pdf). The most difficult incentives to quantify for South Carolina 
are its very large property tax incentives. One major tax incentive program is Fees in Lieu of 
Taxes (FILOT). This typically lowers property taxes for manufacturers from an assessment ratio 
of 10.5 percent to 6.0 percent, as well as freezing property values for tax purposes. (For a 
description, see South Carolina Department of Revenue, South Carolina Tax Incentives for 
Economic Development November 2015, available at https://dor.sc.gov/resources-
site/lawandpolicy/ Documents/0-
SC%20Tax%20Incentive%20for%20Economic%20Development-WebComplete.pdf.) Total 
property-tax revenue from these FILOT projects is projected to be $391.9 million in Fiscal Year 
2017. It seems conservative to project an incentive cost for FILOT of (4 percent / 10.5 percent) 
times $391.9 million, or $168 million. In addition, the Economic Development Incentives report 
does not seem to include costs of the ReadySC customized job training program, which totaled 
$5.8 million in Fiscal Year 2016. (See p. 189 of State of South Carolina, Executive Budget 2015–
2016, available at http://www.stateexpenditures.org/ 
downloads/reference/SC_Proposed_2016.pdf.)  
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Tennessee 
 Some limited information on state tax expenditures is found in the state budget (see State 
of Tennessee, The Budget 2014–15, available at 
http://www.tn.gov/assets/entities/finance/budget/ attachments/2015BudgetDocumentVol1.pdf). 
This budget reports $98.2 million in economic development tax incentives, including $50.1 
million for the Jobs Credit and $55.7 million for the industrial machinery credit. The state budget 
also reports $121.2 million in state spending for economic development, of which the largest 
portion is $64.9 million in 2015 for Fast Track assistance to new and expanding firms. However, 
one of the largest incentives in Tennessee is property tax abatements, which are not regularly 
tracked. The latest statewide information appears to be available in a report from the Tennessee 
Advisory Commission for Intergovernmental Relations (TACIR), in 2004 (see TACIR, Property 
Tax Abatements and Payments in Lieu of Taxes: Impact on Public Education, available at 
https://www.tn.gov/assets/entities/tacir/attachments/prop_tax_abate.pdf). This report listed net 
tax relief from these incentives at $86.3 million as of 2002, but it also found that the data were 
incomplete and said that this was almost certainly a significant underestimate. To get current 
estimates, this appendix extrapolated from the most reliable current estimates of property 
abatements at the local level in Tennessee, which are for Shelby County (the location of 
Memphis). The Shelby County trustee reports that net industrial property-tax incentives in the 
county, after deducting in lieu payments, totaled $44.0 million in 2014. (See Shelby County 
Trustee, In Lieu Properties Annual Report 2014, available at 
http://www.shelbycountytrustee.com/ ArchiveCenter/ViewFile/Item/1264. This subtracts out the 
housing projects from the total.) According to a state Comptroller of the Treasury report, the 
total PILOT (payment in lieu of taxes) industrial property value in Shelby County is worth about 
$2.089 billion, out of a statewide total of $12.014 billion. (Data on each industrial property 
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covered by payment in lieu of tax agreements can be found in Tennessee Office of the 
Comptroller of the Treasury, IDB/H&ED Report 2015, available at 
https://www.comptroller.tn.gov/sboe/idbsumm.asp. These numbers are then summed to get a 
state total of industrial property values covered by PILOTs. Unfortunately, this report does not 
make it clear whether the reported property values are assessed versus market values, or for real 
or personal property, and whether the property is in a particular city, although county is 
identified. Hence it is impossible to directly use these numbers to get a statewide abatement total. 
However, if one assumes the biases are similar for Shelby County versus the rest of the state, one 
can extrapolate from the more detailed Shelby County data. Extrapolating implies a statewide 
total of $253 million [= $44 million × (12.014 / 2.089]).   
Texas 
 Information on state tax expenditures, and some local tax expenditures, is available from 
the Texas Comptroller of Accounts, Tax Exemptions and Tax Incidence, March 2015, 
http://www.texastransparency.org/State_Finance/Budget_Finance/Reports/ 
Tax_Exemptions_and_Incidence/incidence15/96-463_Tax_Incidence2015.pdf. This publication 
suggests economic development tax incentives totaled $544.1 million in Fiscal Year 2015. Of 
that amount, the largest portion, $221.5 million, goes to school property tax abatements 
(“Chapter 313” property tax abatements). This program is expected to ratchet up to a much 
higher level of $525.1 million in 2017 and remain at close to that level in subsequent years. 
Other incentives include $169.2 million in research and development tax incentives (including 
$126.2 million in special sales tax breaks tied to research and development), $78.7 million in 
special tax incentives to encourage expansion in the oil and gas industry, and $44.2 million in 
special tax incentives in Texas enterprise zones. Another report by the Texas comptroller lists 
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state spending supporting business incentives that totaled $320.1 million in 2013. (See Texas 
Comptroller of Accounts, Update To Texas Economic Development Incentive Comprehensive 
Summary Tables, available at http://www.texasahead.org/reports/incentives/pdf/96-1453-2-
Updated-Texas-Economic-Development-Incentive-Grid-2014.pdf.) Of this total, $120 million 
was in the Texas Enterprise Fund (a “deal-closing” fund), $95 million for film subsidies, $57.2 
million to support emerging high-tech companies, and $47.9 million in workforce development 
incentives. C2ER describes some other state spending for economic development in 2015 
totaling $30.4 million (see C2ER Economic Development Expenditure Database), including 
$13.6 million to support technology commercialization, $12.8 million to support an Economic 
Development Bank, and $4 million in special industry assistance. The school property tax 
abatements mentioned above do not include enterprise zone tax abatements. According to a 
report by the Texas Economic Development Bank, FY 2014 Annual Report (available at 
https://texaswideopenforbusiness.com/sites/ 
default/files/01/23/15/bank_annual_report_fy2014.pdf), such enterprise zone tax abatements 
totaled $102 million in 2014.  Texas also allows local governments to set up local economic 
development corporations to carry out economic development activities, funded by a local sales 
tax. These EDCs can carry out a variety of economic development activities. In 2013, business 
incentive activities included a total of $115.8 million, including $112.4 million in what are called 
“direct business incentives,” as well as $3.4 million in job training incentives. (See Texas 
Comptroller, Economic Development Corporation Report, Fiscal Years 2012–2013, available at 
http://www.texastransparency.org/Local_Government/Reports/ 
Economic_Development_Corporations/2013/edcr2013.pdf.) Finally, none of this includes so-
called “Chapter 312” property tax abatements provided by cities and counties, which have been 
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available for a long time. The report on Tax Exemptions and Tax Incidence states that school 
property taxes are 55 percent of total Texas property taxes and that city and county taxes are the 
remaining 45 percent. Therefore, this appendix assumes that in 2017, Chapter 312 property tax 
abatements will be the product of [45 percent (city and county) divided by 55 percent (school)] 
times the $525.1 million in Chapter 313 incentives expected in that year. This may understate 
such incentives, as they have been established for much longer than Chapter 313 abatements.  
Virginia 
 Only information that is somewhat dated is available on Virginia’s tax expenditures. It 
comes from a 2009 report by the Commonwealth Institute, A Drop in the Bucket: Assessing the 
High Cost of Virginia Tax Expenditures, available at 
http://www.thecommonwealthinstitute.org/wp-
content/uploads/2011/08/091109_drop_in_the_bucket_REPORT.pdf.  For 2010, this report 
found $62.5 million in tax incentives for economic development, including $44.5 million for the 
coal industry, $10.0 million for enterprise zones, and $8.0 million for Major Facility Jobs 
Credits. More Virginia business incentives come in the form of expenditures, including $62.1 
million in economic development grants and $12.4 million for enterprise zone business grants. In 
addition, there is $1.6 million in workforce development grants for business-oriented noncredit 
programs at local community colleges. These budget figures come from data made available 
from C2ER’s State Economic Development Expenditure Database for 2015, available at 
http://www.stateexpenditures.org/downloads/reference/VA_FY16_Proposed.pdf. 
Washington 
 Information for state of Washington tax expenditures is available from the Washington 
State Department of Revenue, 2012 Tax Exemption Study, available at 
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Based on this study, the state had $121.4 million in tax credits for economic development in 
2015, including $103.8 million in aerospace credits and $16.6 million in R&D credits. (This 
R&D credit actually expired at the beginning of 2015, so this amount presumably reflects some 
R&D credits received in 2015 for R&D activity in 2014.) Most of these aerospace credits would 
not be in our simulation model, as the simulation model in general does not reflect credits that 
only target a specific company, as these were designed to do.  
Wisconsin 
 Comprehensive tax expenditure information is provided in the state of Wisconsin’s 
Summary of Tax Exemption Devices , available at https://www.revenue.wi.gov/ra/15sumrpt.pdf. 
This report describes $197 million in business tax incentives in Fiscal Year 2014. Prominent 
incentives include $64.9 million for a manufacturing and agriculture credit, $39.6 million for 
various “zone” credits, $33.7 million for various research credits, $15.0 million for an economic 
development credit, and $15.8 million in special credits for the dairy industry.  Some information 
on state spending for economic development is provided in C2ER, State Economic Development 
Program Expenditures Database, available on a subscription basis at http://members.c2er.org/ 
expenditure.asp. These 2015 expenditures include $18 million in grants related to Jobs Tax 
Credits and $25.5 million in special industry assistance grants, mostly in agriculture. Grants to 
business of the Wisconsin Economic Development Corporation are reported to add to total 
spending in 2014 of $10.4 million. (See Legislative Audit Bureau, State of Wisconsin, Wisconsin 
Economic Development Corporation, available at http://legis.wisconsin.gov/LAB/reports/15-
3full.pdf.)
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APPENDIX G:  TIME PATTERN OF INCENTIVES AND TAXES FOR EACH STATE 
 Appendix G simply provides a complete time series of incentives and taxes for each state. 
A table and figure for each state show gross taxes/value-added; incentives/value-added, and net 
taxes/value-added. For each state, these tax and incentive rates are shown for each year from 
1990 to 2015. The rates are the ratio of the present value of gross or net taxes, or incentives, to 
the present value of value-added. The ratios are averages over the 31 export-base industries. The 
tables and figures report these ratios in percentage terms. 
 One could benefit from discussing each state in detail, and what changes in tax policy and 
incentive policy generated the patterns shown. However, in the interest of conserving space, I 
will simply mention one fairly obvious pattern across most of the figures and tables: in general, 
incentive regimes seem to shift abruptly at certain points in time because of major policy shifts, 
and then remain static for some time period.  
 In the following tables and figures, “Tt” is gross taxes, “It” is incentives, and “Nt” is net 
taxes. 
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Figure G1  Time Pattern of Incentives and Taxes for Alabama 
 
 
Table G1  Time Pattern of Incentives and Taxes for Alabama 
Base year TtAlabama ItAlabama NtAlabama 
1990 3.66 0.05 3.61 
1991 3.66 0.05 3.61 
1992 3.68 0.66 3.02 
1993 3.68 0.66 3.02 
1994 3.68 0.66 3.02 
1995 3.68 1.59 2.10 
1996 3.60 1.56 2.04 
1997 3.75 1.52 2.23 
1998 3.67 1.49 2.18 
1999 3.51 1.53 1.99 
2000 3.58 1.55 2.03 
2001 3.91 1.85 2.07 
2002 3.97 1.87 2.10 
2003 3.96 1.87 2.10 
2004 3.96 1.86 2.09 
2005 4.19 1.86 2.33 
2006 4.19 1.86 2.33 
2007 4.19 1.86 2.33 
2008 4.36 1.85 2.50 
2009 4.35 1.85 2.50 
2010 4.35 1.85 2.50 
2011 4.49 1.80 2.69 
2012 4.49 1.80 2.69 
2013 4.49 1.80 2.69 
2014 4.49 1.80 2.69 
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Figure G2  Time Pattern of Incentives and Taxes for Arizona 
 
 
Table G2  Time Pattern of Incentives and Taxes for Arizona 
Base year TtArizona ItArizona NtArizona 
1990 6.66 0.00 6.66 
1991 6.59 0.00 6.59 
1992 6.59 0.40 6.20 
1993 6.59 0.40 6.20 
1994 6.54 0.39 6.15 
1995 6.54 0.39 6.15 
1996 6.57 0.39 6.17 
1997 6.59 0.39 6.20 
1998 6.54 0.39 6.15 
1999 6.58 0.38 6.20 
2000 6.78 0.38 6.41 
2001 6.54 0.52 6.02 
2002 6.53 0.52 6.01 
2003 6.25 0.53 5.72 
2004 5.97 0.53 5.44 
2005 6.11 0.53 5.58 
2006 5.78 0.53 5.25 
2007 5.75 0.52 5.22 
2008 5.03 0.52 4.50 
2009 4.59 0.52 4.07 
2010 4.64 0.52 4.12 
2011 4.92 0.91 4.01 
2012 5.03 0.90 4.13 
2013 5.40 1.13 4.27 
2014 5.30 1.09 4.21 
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Figure G3  Time Pattern of Incentives and Taxes for California 
 
 
Table G3  Time Pattern of Incentives and Taxes for California 
Base year TtCalifornia ItCalifornia NtCalifornia 
1990 4.36 0.30 4.06 
1991 4.28 0.30 3.99 
1992 4.28 0.30 3.99 
1993 4.28 0.30 3.99 
1994 4.28 0.47 3.81 
1995 4.28 0.47 3.81 
1996 4.28 0.47 3.81 
1997 4.16 0.55 3.61 
1998 4.32 0.54 3.78 
1999 4.17 0.57 3.60 
2000 4.27 0.63 3.64 
2001 4.29 0.63 3.66 
2002 4.29 0.63 3.66 
2003 4.20 0.63 3.57 
2004 4.43 0.48 3.95 
2005 4.35 0.48 3.86 
2006 3.93 0.48 3.44 
2007 3.93 0.48 3.45 
2008 4.34 0.48 3.86 
2009 4.37 0.48 3.89 
2010 4.55 0.48 4.07 
2011 4.52 0.47 4.05 
2012 4.35 0.47 3.88 
2013 4.38 0.47 3.91 
2014 4.38 0.47 3.91 
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Figure G4  Time Pattern of Incentives and Taxes for Colorado 
 
 
Table G4  Time Pattern of Incentives and Taxes for Colorado 
Base year TtColorado ItColorado NtColorado 
1990 4.44 0.07 4.37 
1991 4.42 0.07 4.35 
1992 4.40 0.07 4.34 
1993 4.39 0.07 4.32 
1994 4.37 0.07 4.30 
1995 4.37 0.07 4.30 
1996 4.26 0.07 4.19 
1997 4.15 0.07 4.08 
1998 4.04 0.07 3.97 
1999 3.92 0.07 3.85 
2000 3.82 0.07 3.75 
2001 3.71 0.07 3.64 
2002 3.60 0.07 3.53 
2003 3.67 0.07 3.60 
2004 3.74 0.07 3.67 
2005 3.75 0.07 3.68 
2006 3.81 0.07 3.74 
2007 3.87 0.07 3.80 
2008 3.85 0.07 3.79 
2009 3.80 0.59 3.22 
2010 3.74 0.59 3.16 
2011 3.76 0.59 3.17 
2012 3.92 0.59 3.34 
2013 4.36 0.58 3.78 
2014 4.36 0.69 3.67 
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Figure G5  Time Pattern of Incentives and Taxes for Connecticut 
 
 
Table G5  Time Pattern of Incentives and Taxes for Connecticut 
Base year TtConnecticut ItConnecticut NtConnecticut 
1990 8.15 0.78 7.37 
1991 8.15 0.78 7.37 
1992 7.96 0.78 7.18 
1993 7.77 0.88 6.88 
1994 7.77 0.88 6.88 
1995 7.72 0.88 6.84 
1996 7.64 0.88 6.76 
1997 7.60 0.88 6.72 
1998 7.43 1.09 6.34 
1999 7.26 1.08 6.18 
2000 7.10 1.10 6.00 
2001 7.00 1.09 5.91 
2002 7.00 1.08 5.91 
2003 6.49 0.97 5.51 
2004 5.80 0.85 4.96 
2005 5.19 0.79 4.40 
2006 5.43 1.01 4.43 
2007 5.13 1.01 4.11 
2008 5.35 0.97 4.38 
2009 5.24 0.94 4.30 
2010 4.61 0.84 3.77 
2011 4.94 0.84 4.09 
2012 5.34 1.76 3.58 
2013 5.90 1.81 4.10 
2014 5.90 0.69 5.22 
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Figure G6  Time Pattern of Incentives and Taxes for District of Columbia 
 
 
Table G6  Time Pattern of Incentives and Taxes for District of Columbia 
Base year TtDistrictofColumbia ItDistrictofColumbia NtDistrictofColumbia 
1990 6.50 0.00 6.50 
1991 6.50 0.00 6.50 
1992 6.50 0.00 6.50 
1993 6.45 0.00 6.45 
1994 6.50 0.00 6.50 
1995 6.39 0.00 6.39 
1996 6.38 0.00 6.38 
1997 6.57 2.33 4.24 
1998 6.65 2.31 4.34 
1999 6.41 2.28 4.13 
2000 6.37 2.25 4.12 
2001 6.25 2.14 4.11 
2002 6.11 2.04 4.08 
2003 6.11 2.04 4.08 
2004 6.22 2.04 4.18 
2005 6.02 1.96 4.06 
2006 5.87 1.85 4.02 
2007 5.93 1.90 4.04 
2008 5.93 1.89 4.04 
2009 5.59 1.63 3.96 
2010 5.65 1.63 4.01 
2011 5.61 1.60 4.01 
2012 6.02 1.92 4.10 
2013 5.69 1.67 4.03 
2014 5.69 1.67 4.03 
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Figure G7  Time Pattern of Incentives and Taxes for Florida 
 
 
Table G7  Time Pattern of Incentives and Taxes for Florida 
Base year TtFlorida ItFlorida NtFlorida 
1990 4.76 0.00 4.76 
1991 4.76 0.00 4.76 
1992 4.76 0.00 4.76 
1993 4.77 0.07 4.70 
1994 4.77 0.07 4.70 
1995 4.77 0.33 4.43 
1996 4.92 0.33 4.59 
1997 5.27 0.32 4.95 
1998 5.60 1.03 4.57 
1999 5.36 1.03 4.33 
2000 5.30 1.02 4.27 
2001 5.53 1.01 4.51 
2002 5.35 1.01 4.33 
2003 5.17 1.01 4.16 
2004 4.94 1.02 3.92 
2005 5.07 1.01 4.06 
2006 4.96 1.01 3.95 
2007 4.76 1.01 3.75 
2008 4.75 1.01 3.74 
2009 4.76 1.00 3.75 
2010 4.69 1.00 3.69 
2011 4.59 1.12 3.47 
2012 4.75 1.25 3.50 
2013 4.68 1.24 3.44 
2014 4.68 1.23 3.44 
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Figure G8  Time Pattern of Incentives and Taxes for Georgia 
 
 
Table G8  Time Pattern of Incentives and Taxes for Georgia 
Base year TtGeorgia ItGeorgia NtGeorgia 
1990 4.23 0.02 4.20 
1991 4.23 0.02 4.20 
1992 4.23 0.02 4.20 
1993 4.23 0.02 4.20 
1994 4.23 0.02 4.20 
1995 4.16 0.61 3.55 
1996 4.21 0.60 3.61 
1997 4.38 0.59 3.79 
1998 4.28 0.67 3.61 
1999 4.00 0.66 3.34 
2000 3.59 0.66 2.93 
2001 3.87 0.65 3.22 
2002 4.08 0.63 3.44 
2003 4.05 0.63 3.43 
2004 4.14 0.62 3.53 
2005 4.10 0.61 3.49 
2006 4.07 0.58 3.48 
2007 3.96 0.57 3.39 
2008 3.88 0.56 3.32 
2009 4.02 0.55 3.47 
2010 4.11 0.55 3.57 
2011 4.08 0.54 3.54 
2012 4.11 0.54 3.57 
2013 4.04 0.53 3.51 
2014 4.04 0.53 3.51 

















APPENDICES TO: A New Panel Database 
on Business Incentives for Economic Development 
 
 W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research G-10 
 
Figure G9  Time Pattern of Incentives and Taxes for Illinois 
 
 
Table G9  Time Pattern of Incentives and Taxes for Illinois 
Base year TtIllinois ItIllinois NtIllinois 
1990 6.10 0.36 5.74 
1991 6.10 0.44 5.66 
1992 6.10 0.44 5.66 
1993 6.10 0.45 5.65 
1994 6.10 0.45 5.65 
1995 6.10 0.58 5.52 
1996 6.06 0.59 5.47 
1997 6.01 0.60 5.41 
1998 5.78 0.61 5.17 
1999 5.86 0.62 5.24 
2000 5.92 1.17 4.75 
2001 5.88 1.18 4.70 
2002 5.92 1.19 4.74 
2003 5.17 1.13 4.04 
2004 4.43 1.08 3.34 
2005 4.29 1.08 3.21 
2006 4.34 1.06 3.28 
2007 4.01 1.04 2.97 
2008 4.22 1.02 3.20 
2009 4.27 1.03 3.24 
2010 4.11 1.00 3.11 
2011 4.58 1.32 3.27 
2012 5.33 1.39 3.94 
2013 5.46 1.38 4.08 
2014 5.46 1.38 4.08 
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Figure G10  Time Pattern of Incentives and Taxes for Indiana 
 
 
Table G10  Time Pattern of Incentives and Taxes for Indiana 
Base year TtIndiana ItIndiana NtIndiana 
1990 5.17 0.81 4.36 
1991 5.17 0.81 4.36 
1992 5.17 0.81 4.36 
1993 5.17 0.81 4.36 
1994 5.17 2.00 3.17 
1995 5.17 2.00 3.17 
1996 5.03 1.99 3.04 
1997 4.95 1.97 2.98 
1998 4.87 1.96 2.91 
1999 5.08 2.02 3.05 
2000 5.28 2.09 3.20 
2001 5.01 2.05 2.96 
2002 4.84 2.00 2.84 
2003 5.15 2.70 2.45 
2004 5.34 2.69 2.65 
2005 5.39 2.68 2.72 
2006 5.42 2.71 2.71 
2007 6.39 3.01 3.38 
2008 5.73 2.89 2.84 
2009 5.29 2.76 2.53 
2010 5.54 2.80 2.75 
2011 5.67 2.83 2.84 
2012 5.42 2.75 2.67 
2013 4.71 2.74 1.97 
2014 4.63 2.71 1.91 
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Figure G11  Time Pattern of Incentives and Taxes for Iowa 
 
 
Table G11  Time Pattern of Incentives and Taxes for Iowa 
Base year TtIowa ItIowa NtIowa 
1990 6.08 0.64 5.43 
1991 6.08 0.64 5.43 
1992 6.08 0.64 5.43 
1993 6.08 0.64 5.43 
1994 6.17 2.58 3.59 
1995 6.17 2.58 3.59 
1996 6.18 2.59 3.59 
1997 5.90 2.59 3.31 
1998 5.91 2.59 3.32 
1999 5.71 2.52 3.19 
2000 5.50 2.45 3.05 
2001 5.45 2.43 3.02 
2002 5.40 2.41 2.99 
2003 5.53 2.45 3.07 
2004 5.65 2.50 3.15 
2005 5.56 2.47 3.09 
2006 5.54 2.47 3.07 
2007 5.66 2.51 3.14 
2008 5.72 2.55 3.18 
2009 5.87 2.53 3.34 
2010 5.99 2.57 3.42 
2011 6.01 2.58 3.43 
2012 6.25 2.67 3.58 
2013 6.11 2.62 3.49 
2014 6.11 2.62 3.49 
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Figure G12  Time Pattern of Incentives and Taxes for Kentucky 
 
 
Table G12  Time Pattern of Incentives and Taxes for Kentucky 
Base year TtKentucky ItKentucky NtKentucky 
1990 3.56 0.11 3.46 
1991 3.56 0.11 3.46 
1992 3.56 2.67 0.89 
1993 3.56 2.67 0.89 
1994 3.56 2.67 0.89 
1995 3.56 2.67 0.89 
1996 3.56 2.67 0.89 
1997 3.56 2.67 0.89 
1998 3.56 2.67 0.89 
1999 3.56 2.67 0.89 
2000 3.56 2.67 0.89 
2001 3.56 2.67 0.89 
2002 3.56 2.67 0.89 
2003 3.73 2.67 1.07 
2004 3.91 2.66 1.24 
2005 3.62 2.49 1.13 
2006 3.52 2.48 1.04 
2007 3.34 2.33 1.01 
2008 3.37 2.34 1.04 
2009 3.41 2.33 1.08 
2010 3.50 2.34 1.16 
2011 3.41 2.34 1.08 
2012 3.50 2.34 1.16 
2013 3.51 2.34 1.17 
2014 3.51 2.34 1.17 
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Figure G13  Time Pattern of Incentives and Taxes for Louisiana 
 
 
Table G13  Time Pattern of Incentives and Taxes for Louisiana 
Base year TtLouisiana ItLouisiana NtLouisiana 
1990 6.28 0.86 5.41 
1991 6.28 0.86 5.41 
1992 6.28 0.86 5.41 
1993 6.28 0.86 5.41 
1994 6.28 0.86 5.41 
1995 6.28 0.86 5.41 
1996 6.24 3.01 3.23 
1997 6.13 3.00 3.13 
1998 6.09 3.00 3.10 
1999 6.14 3.00 3.14 
2000 6.20 3.01 3.19 
2001 6.02 3.01 3.01 
2002 6.03 3.01 3.01 
2003 6.12 3.25 2.87 
2004 6.04 3.27 2.76 
2005 6.38 3.27 3.11 
2006 6.58 3.36 3.22 
2007 6.01 3.19 2.82 
2008 5.45 3.18 2.27 
2009 5.78 3.28 2.50 
2010 5.97 3.34 2.63 
2011 5.35 3.37 1.98 
2012 5.16 3.31 1.85 
2013 5.26 3.33 1.92 
2014 5.26 3.33 1.92 
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Figure G14  Time Pattern of Incentives and Taxes for Maryland 
 
 
Table G14  Time Pattern of Incentives and Taxes for Maryland 
Base year TtMaryland ItMaryland NtMaryland 
1990 4.94 0.00 4.94 
1991 4.94 0.00 4.94 
1992 4.87 0.00 4.87 
1993 4.87 0.00 4.87 
1994 4.87 0.00 4.87 
1995 4.87 0.00 4.87 
1996 4.93 0.15 4.79 
1997 4.90 0.14 4.76 
1998 4.96 0.14 4.82 
1999 4.91 0.14 4.78 
2000 4.86 0.40 4.47 
2001 4.73 0.38 4.34 
2002 4.69 0.38 4.31 
2003 4.67 0.38 4.29 
2004 4.66 0.38 4.28 
2005 4.78 0.37 4.41 
2006 4.29 0.37 3.91 
2007 4.39 0.37 4.02 
2008 4.11 0.37 3.74 
2009 4.43 0.37 4.06 
2010 4.95 0.37 4.58 
2011 5.01 0.37 4.65 
2012 4.98 0.37 4.62 
2013 4.96 0.37 4.60 
2014 4.96 0.36 4.60 
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Figure G15  Time Pattern of Incentives and Taxes for Massachusetts 
 
 
Table G15  Time Pattern of Incentives and Taxes for Massachusetts 
Base year TtMassachusetts ItMassachusetts NtMassachusetts 
1990 5.34 0.06 5.28 
1991 5.34 0.33 5.01 
1992 5.34 0.33 5.01 
1993 5.34 0.33 5.01 
1994 5.34 0.42 4.92 
1995 5.34 0.42 4.92 
1996 5.22 0.42 4.80 
1997 5.10 0.42 4.68 
1998 4.97 0.41 4.56 
1999 4.86 0.49 4.37 
2000 4.74 0.49 4.25 
2001 4.81 0.49 4.32 
2002 4.87 0.48 4.39 
2003 4.89 0.49 4.40 
2004 4.90 0.49 4.42 
2005 4.87 0.49 4.39 
2006 4.66 0.49 4.18 
2007 4.38 0.49 3.89 
2008 4.29 0.49 3.80 
2009 4.50 0.54 3.96 
2010 4.41 0.53 3.87 
2011 4.44 0.53 3.91 
2012 4.64 0.53 4.12 
2013 4.65 0.53 4.12 
2014 4.65 0.53 4.12 
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Figure G16  Time Pattern of Incentives and Taxes for Michigan 
 
 
Table G16  Time Pattern of Incentives and Taxes for Michigan 
Base year TtMichigan ItMichigan NtMichigan 
1990 6.84 1.79 5.05 
1991 6.81 1.79 5.03 
1992 6.81 1.83 4.98 
1993 6.77 1.83 4.94 
1994 6.19 1.53 4.66 
1995 6.20 2.83 3.37 
1996 6.21 2.84 3.38 
1997 6.10 2.84 3.27 
1998 6.11 2.84 3.27 
1999 6.00 2.89 3.11 
2000 6.20 3.05 3.16 
2001 6.11 3.03 3.08 
2002 6.01 3.02 2.99 
2003 6.04 3.03 3.01 
2004 6.07 3.04 3.03 
2005 5.63 2.88 2.75 
2006 6.30 3.13 3.17 
2007 6.50 3.21 3.29 
2008 6.51 3.29 3.22 
2009 6.08 3.18 2.89 
2010 6.06 3.35 2.70 
2011 6.11 3.37 2.74 
2012 5.57 2.33 3.24 
2013 5.56 2.09 3.47 
2014 5.56 2.08 3.48 
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Figure G17  Time Pattern of Incentives and Taxes for Minnesota 
 
 
Table G17  Time Pattern of Incentives and Taxes for Minnesota 
Base year TtMinnesota ItMinnesota NtMinnesota 
1990 7.30 0.10 7.19 
1991 7.30 0.10 7.19 
1992 7.30 0.10 7.19 
1993 7.30 0.10 7.19 
1994 7.30 0.10 7.19 
1995 7.30 0.10 7.19 
1996 7.11 0.10 7.00 
1997 6.50 0.10 6.39 
1998 6.31 0.10 6.20 
1999 5.99 0.10 5.88 
2000 5.80 0.10 5.70 
2001 5.72 0.10 5.62 
2002 5.41 0.10 5.30 
2003 5.43 0.10 5.33 
2004 5.46 0.10 5.35 
2005 5.33 0.10 5.23 
2006 5.37 0.10 5.27 
2007 5.24 0.10 5.14 
2008 5.19 0.10 5.08 
2009 5.33 0.10 5.23 
2010 5.48 0.04 5.45 
2011 5.78 0.10 5.67 
2012 5.89 0.10 5.78 
2013 6.07 0.10 5.96 
2014 6.05 1.14 4.90 
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Figure G18  Time Pattern of Incentives and Taxes for Missouri 
 
 
Table G18  Time Pattern of Incentives and Taxes for Missouri 
Base year TtMissouri ItMissouri NtMissouri 
1990 4.79 0.00 4.79 
1991 4.79 0.00 4.79 
1992 4.81 0.32 4.49 
1993 4.53 0.32 4.21 
1994 4.76 0.32 4.44 
1995 4.76 0.32 4.44 
1996 4.76 0.32 4.44 
1997 4.76 0.32 4.44 
1998 4.76 0.32 4.44 
1999 4.76 0.32 4.44 
2000 4.82 0.32 4.50 
2001 4.80 0.35 4.45 
2002 4.81 0.35 4.46 
2003 4.84 0.35 4.49 
2004 4.86 0.35 4.51 
2005 4.84 0.32 4.52 
2006 4.86 1.55 3.31 
2007 4.80 1.55 3.24 
2008 4.80 1.55 3.25 
2009 4.97 1.55 3.42 
2010 4.93 1.55 3.38 
2011 5.02 1.55 3.47 
2012 5.09 1.55 3.54 
2013 5.01 1.55 3.45 
2014 4.84 0.79 4.04 
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Figure G19  Time Pattern of Incentives and Taxes for Nebraska 
 
 
Table G19  Time Pattern of Incentives and Taxes for Nebraska 
Base year TtNebraska ItNebraska NtNebraska 
1990 5.72 2.07 3.65 
1991 6.00 2.19 3.81 
1992 5.73 2.08 3.65 
1993 5.73 2.08 3.65 
1994 5.73 2.08 3.65 
1995 5.73 2.08 3.65 
1996 5.59 2.09 3.51 
1997 5.33 2.03 3.31 
1998 5.20 2.03 3.17 
1999 4.93 2.04 2.89 
2000 4.40 1.84 2.57 
2001 4.88 2.10 2.78 
2002 4.98 2.10 2.89 
2003 5.14 2.15 3.00 
2004 5.19 2.15 3.04 
2005 5.21 2.15 3.06 
2006 5.13 2.66 2.47 
2007 5.12 2.66 2.46 
2008 4.68 2.51 2.17 
2009 4.70 2.50 2.20 
2010 4.78 2.50 2.28 
2011 4.82 2.50 2.32 
2012 4.79 2.54 2.25 
2013 4.81 2.54 2.26 
2014 4.81 2.54 2.26 














APPENDICES TO: A New Panel Database 
on Business Incentives for Economic Development 
 
 W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research G-21 
 
Figure G20  Time Pattern of Incentives and Taxes for Nevada 
 
 
Table G20  Time Pattern of Incentives and Taxes for Nevada 
Base year TtNevada ItNevada NtNevada 
1990 2.03 0.04 2.00 
1991 2.03 0.04 2.00 
1992 2.03 0.04 2.00 
1993 2.03 0.04 2.00 
1994 2.03 0.04 2.00 
1995 2.03 0.04 2.00 
1996 2.15 0.04 2.11 
1997 2.41 0.04 2.37 
1998 2.52 0.04 2.48 
1999 2.34 0.22 2.12 
2000 2.37 0.22 2.15 
2001 2.60 0.22 2.38 
2002 2.62 0.23 2.39 
2003 2.63 0.23 2.40 
2004 2.69 0.23 2.46 
2005 2.70 0.23 2.47 
2006 2.74 0.23 2.51 
2007 2.74 0.23 2.51 
2008 2.74 0.23 2.50 
2009 2.80 0.23 2.57 
2010 2.79 0.23 2.56 
2011 2.80 0.23 2.57 
2012 2.80 0.23 2.56 
2013 2.79 0.23 2.56 
2014 2.79 0.23 2.56 
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Figure G21  Time Pattern of Incentives and Taxes for New Jersey 
 
 
Table G21  Time Pattern of Incentives and Taxes for New Jersey 
Base year TtNewJersey ItNewJersey NtNewJersey 
1990 6.45 0.00 6.45 
1991 6.45 0.00 6.45 
1992 6.39 0.00 6.39 
1993 6.45 0.02 6.43 
1994 6.39 0.42 5.97 
1995 6.39 0.42 5.97 
1996 6.02 1.36 4.66 
1997 5.73 1.36 4.37 
1998 5.44 1.36 4.08 
1999 5.58 1.36 4.23 
2000 5.61 1.35 4.26 
2001 5.25 1.35 3.90 
2002 4.98 1.35 3.63 
2003 4.78 1.35 3.43 
2004 4.58 1.35 3.23 
2005 4.48 1.35 3.13 
2006 4.39 1.35 3.04 
2007 4.41 1.35 3.06 
2008 4.35 1.35 3.00 
2009 4.35 1.35 3.00 
2010 4.41 1.35 3.06 
2011 4.62 1.34 3.28 
2012 4.59 1.34 3.24 
2013 4.37 1.34 3.03 
2014 4.32 2.87 1.45 
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Figure G22  Time Pattern of Incentives and Taxes for New Mexico 
 
 
Table G22  Time Pattern of Incentives and Taxes for New Mexico 
Base year TtNewMexico ItNewMexico NtNewMexico 
1990 7.37 1.89 5.48 
1991 7.37 1.89 5.48 
1992 7.37 1.89 5.48 
1993 7.37 1.89 5.48 
1994 7.37 1.89 5.48 
1995 7.37 1.89 5.48 
1996 7.39 1.90 5.48 
1997 7.41 1.92 5.48 
1998 7.42 1.94 5.48 
1999 7.40 1.92 5.48 
2000 7.56 2.12 5.44 
2001 7.51 2.38 5.13 
2002 7.61 2.48 5.13 
2003 7.75 2.45 5.30 
2004 7.72 4.25 3.47 
2005 8.25 4.11 4.14 
2006 8.43 4.31 4.12 
2007 8.63 4.43 4.20 
2008 8.63 4.45 4.18 
2009 8.59 4.45 4.14 
2010 8.23 4.30 3.93 
2011 8.57 4.37 4.20 
2012 8.63 4.45 4.18 
2013 8.70 4.55 4.15 
2014 8.58 4.57 4.02 
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Figure G23  Time Pattern of Incentives and Taxes for New York 
 
 
Table G23  Time Pattern of Incentives and Taxes for New York 
Base year TtNewYork ItNewYork NtNewYork 
1990 6.23 1.58 4.66 
1991 6.23 1.58 4.65 
1992 6.23 1.58 4.65 
1993 6.23 1.58 4.65 
1994 6.19 1.58 4.61 
1995 6.19 1.59 4.60 
1996 5.94 1.55 4.39 
1997 5.86 1.52 4.34 
1998 5.78 1.49 4.28 
1999 5.81 1.51 4.30 
2000 5.62 1.51 4.10 
2001 5.64 5.79 -0.15 
2002 5.67 5.79 -0.13 
2003 5.85 5.92 -0.07 
2004 6.02 6.05 -0.03 
2005 5.90 5.72 0.18 
2006 5.71 5.54 0.17 
2007 5.28 5.20 0.07 
2008 5.20 5.18 0.03 
2009 5.33 5.21 0.13 
2010 5.29 3.74 1.55 
2011 5.24 3.73 1.51 
2012 5.14 3.71 1.44 
2013 5.16 3.71 1.45 
2014 4.75 3.53 1.22 
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Figure G24  Time Pattern of Incentives and Taxes for North Carolina 
 
 
Table G24  Time Pattern of Incentives and Taxes for North Carolina 
Base year TtNorthCarolina ItNorthCarolina NtNorthCarolina 
1990 3.51 0.01 3.49 
1991 3.71 0.01 3.70 
1992 3.70 0.01 3.68 
1993 3.68 0.01 3.67 
1994 3.67 0.01 3.65 
1995 3.65 0.01 3.64 
1996 3.70 0.38 3.32 
1997 3.93 0.37 3.56 
1998 3.98 0.37 3.61 
1999 3.72 0.36 3.37 
2000 3.65 0.36 3.29 
2001 3.62 0.36 3.26 
2002 3.66 0.30 3.36 
2003 3.76 1.14 2.61 
2004 3.72 1.15 2.57 
2005 4.01 1.14 2.87 
2006 4.09 1.08 3.01 
2007 4.10 1.12 2.98 
2008 4.03 1.12 2.91 
2009 3.97 1.12 2.85 
2010 4.19 1.12 3.07 
2011 4.11 1.12 2.99 
2012 3.91 1.12 2.79 
2013 3.97 1.12 2.85 
2014 3.80 0.93 2.87 
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Figure G25  Time Pattern of Incentives and Taxes for Ohio 
 
 
Table G25  Time Pattern of Incentives and Taxes for Ohio 
Base year TtOhio ItOhio NtOhio 
1990 5.26 0.73 4.53 
1991 5.26 0.73 4.53 
1992 5.26 0.73 4.53 
1993 5.26 1.52 3.74 
1994 5.26 1.52 3.74 
1995 5.26 1.67 3.59 
1996 5.26 1.66 3.60 
1997 5.26 1.65 3.62 
1998 5.27 1.50 3.77 
1999 5.22 1.51 3.71 
2000 5.30 1.53 3.76 
2001 5.18 1.51 3.68 
2002 5.07 1.48 3.59 
2003 5.15 1.52 3.63 
2004 5.39 1.64 3.75 
2005 5.60 1.65 3.95 
2006 4.95 1.26 3.69 
2007 4.34 1.21 3.13 
2008 4.07 1.12 2.95 
2009 3.69 1.09 2.60 
2010 3.48 1.11 2.37 
2011 3.45 1.11 2.34 
2012 3.64 1.17 2.47 
2013 3.61 1.05 2.57 
2014 3.61 1.05 2.57 
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Figure G26  Time Pattern of Incentives and Taxes for Oregon 
 
 
Table G26  Time Pattern of Incentives and Taxes for Oregon 
Base year TtOregon ItOregon NtOregon 
1990 3.11 0.13 2.97 
1991 3.05 0.13 2.92 
1992 3.05 0.13 2.92 
1993 3.05 0.13 2.92 
1994 3.05 0.13 2.92 
1995 3.05 0.13 2.92 
1996 3.09 0.13 2.95 
1997 3.12 0.13 2.99 
1998 3.16 0.13 3.02 
1999 3.40 0.13 3.26 
2000 3.63 0.13 3.50 
2001 3.68 0.13 3.55 
2002 3.73 0.13 3.59 
2003 3.70 0.13 3.56 
2004 3.75 0.13 3.62 
2005 2.90 0.13 2.77 
2006 2.87 0.13 2.74 
2007 2.90 0.13 2.76 
2008 2.86 0.13 2.72 
2009 3.12 0.13 2.98 
2010 3.16 0.13 3.03 
2011 3.79 0.70 3.09 
2012 3.82 0.70 3.12 
2013 3.99 0.70 3.29 
2014 3.99 0.70 3.29 
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Figure G27  Time Pattern of Incentives and Taxes for Pennsylvania 
 
 
Table G27  Time Pattern of Incentives and Taxes for Pennsylvania 
Base year TtPennsylvania ItPennsylvania NtPennsylvania 
1990 5.91 0.05 5.87 
1991 6.32 0.05 6.27 
1992 6.32 0.05 6.27 
1993 6.32 0.05 6.27 
1994 6.31 0.05 6.26 
1995 6.09 0.05 6.04 
1996 6.10 0.11 6.00 
1997 6.11 0.31 5.80 
1998 6.12 0.30 5.82 
1999 6.16 0.30 5.86 
2000 6.36 1.63 4.74 
2001 5.67 1.36 4.32 
2002 4.98 1.09 3.89 
2003 4.84 1.03 3.81 
2004 4.70 0.96 3.74 
2005 5.62 1.36 4.26 
2006 5.84 1.46 4.38 
2007 5.68 1.41 4.27 
2008 5.63 1.38 4.25 
2009 5.93 1.55 4.38 
2010 5.95 1.54 4.41 
2011 5.83 1.40 4.43 
2012 5.42 1.29 4.13 
2013 5.65 1.56 4.09 
2014 5.65 1.56 4.09 
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Figure G28  Time Pattern of Incentives and Taxes for South Carolina 
 
 
Table G28  Time Pattern of Incentives and Taxes for South Carolina 
Base year TtSouthCarolina ItSouthCarolina NtSouthCarolina 
1990 4.63 0.30 4.32 
1991 4.63 0.30 4.32 
1992 4.63 0.30 4.32 
1993 4.63 0.30 4.32 
1994 4.60 0.30 4.30 
1995 4.60 1.46 3.15 
1996 4.60 1.45 3.15 
1997 4.75 2.07 2.68 
1998 4.75 2.07 2.68 
1999 4.75 2.06 2.68 
2000 4.75 2.06 2.69 
2001 4.63 2.06 2.57 
2002 4.75 2.21 2.54 
2003 5.22 2.30 2.92 
2004 5.70 2.40 3.30 
2005 5.11 2.22 2.89 
2006 5.26 2.34 2.91 
2007 5.70 2.38 3.32 
2008 5.67 2.42 3.26 
2009 5.19 2.25 2.94 
2010 5.27 2.31 2.96 
2011 5.60 2.37 3.24 
2012 5.72 2.39 3.32 
2013 5.85 2.40 3.45 
2014 5.85 2.39 3.46 
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Figure G29  Time Pattern of Incentives and Taxes for Tennessee 
 
 
Table G29  Time Pattern of Incentives and Taxes for Tennessee 
Base year TtTennessee ItTennessee NtTennessee 
1990 4.88 0.05 4.83 
1991 4.88 0.05 4.83 
1992 4.88 0.05 4.83 
1993 4.88 0.05 4.83 
1994 4.88 0.05 4.83 
1995 4.88 0.08 4.80 
1996 4.75 0.08 4.67 
1997 4.78 0.08 4.70 
1998 4.44 0.08 4.36 
1999 4.76 0.24 4.52 
2000 5.03 0.24 4.79 
2001 5.13 0.24 4.90 
2002 5.33 0.24 5.09 
2003 5.38 0.23 5.15 
2004 5.46 0.23 5.23 
2005 5.54 0.23 5.32 
2006 5.54 0.22 5.32 
2007 5.41 0.22 5.19 
2008 5.35 0.22 5.13 
2009 5.44 0.22 5.23 
2010 5.57 2.63 2.94 
2011 6.16 2.96 3.20 
2012 6.12 2.93 3.19 
2013 6.32 3.09 3.23 
2014 6.31 2.98 3.33 
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Figure G30  Time Pattern of Incentives and Taxes for Texas 
 
 
Table G30  Time Pattern of Incentives and Taxes for Texas 
Base year TtTexas ItTexas NtTexas 
1990 4.88 0.78 4.09 
1991 5.54 0.78 4.76 
1992 5.54 0.78 4.76 
1993 5.54 0.78 4.76 
1994 5.62 0.78 4.83 
1995 5.62 0.78 4.83 
1996 5.65 0.66 4.99 
1997 5.68 0.66 5.02 
1998 5.72 0.67 5.05 
1999 5.69 0.67 5.02 
2000 5.67 0.74 4.93 
2001 5.70 0.77 4.93 
2002 5.73 0.82 4.91 
2003 5.69 0.82 4.87 
2004 5.65 1.46 4.19 
2005 5.74 1.46 4.28 
2006 5.59 1.40 4.19 
2007 5.15 1.32 3.83 
2008 4.76 1.19 3.58 
2009 4.89 1.22 3.68 
2010 4.91 1.20 3.71 
2011 4.94 1.19 3.75 
2012 4.99 1.19 3.80 
2013 5.03 1.19 3.84 
2014 5.03 1.25 3.78 
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Figure G31  Time Pattern of Incentives and Taxes for Virginia 
 
 
Table G31  Time Pattern of Incentives and Taxes for Virginia 
Base year TtVirginia ItVirginia NtVirginia 
1990 3.49 0.04 3.44 
1991 3.49 0.04 3.44 
1992 3.49 0.04 3.44 
1993 3.49 0.04 3.44 
1994 3.49 0.04 3.44 
1995 3.49 0.04 3.44 
1996 3.63 0.30 3.33 
1997 3.77 0.29 3.47 
1998 3.91 0.29 3.62 
1999 3.86 0.28 3.58 
2000 3.76 0.28 3.48 
2001 3.62 0.27 3.35 
2002 3.49 0.27 3.22 
2003 3.43 0.26 3.17 
2004 3.43 0.26 3.18 
2005 2.70 0.25 2.45 
2006 2.68 0.24 2.44 
2007 2.60 0.24 2.36 
2008 2.58 0.23 2.35 
2009 2.60 0.30 2.29 
2010 2.61 0.30 2.31 
2011 2.62 0.29 2.33 
2012 2.68 0.29 2.39 
2013 2.83 0.28 2.55 
2014 2.77 0.28 2.50 
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Figure G32  Time Pattern of Incentives and Taxes for Washington 
 
 
Table G32  Time Pattern of Incentives and Taxes for Washington 
Base year TtWashington ItWashington NtWashington 
1990 4.96 0.07 4.89 
1991 4.98 0.07 4.91 
1992 4.98 0.07 4.91 
1993 5.50 0.07 5.43 
1994 5.50 0.12 5.37 
1995 5.24 0.12 5.12 
1996 5.26 0.12 5.15 
1997 5.02 0.11 4.92 
1998 4.87 0.11 4.76 
1999 5.05 0.11 4.95 
2000 5.06 0.11 4.95 
2001 5.03 0.11 4.92 
2002 4.96 0.11 4.86 
2003 4.97 0.11 4.86 
2004 4.78 0.11 4.68 
2005 4.94 0.11 4.83 
2006 4.86 0.11 4.75 
2007 4.81 0.11 4.70 
2008 4.78 0.11 4.67 
2009 4.74 0.12 4.62 
2010 4.77 0.12 4.65 
2011 5.07 0.12 4.95 
2012 5.14 0.12 5.02 
2013 5.15 0.12 5.03 
2014 5.15 0.12 5.03 













APPENDICES TO: A New Panel Database 
on Business Incentives for Economic Development 
 
 W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research G-34 
 
Figure G33 Time Pattern of Incentives and Taxes for Wisconsin 
 
 
Table G33  Time Pattern of Incentives and Taxes for Wisconsin 
Base year TtWisconsin ItWisconsin NtWisconsin 
1990 6.43 0.13 6.29 
1991 6.43 0.13 6.29 
1992 6.43 0.13 6.29 
1993 6.43 0.13 6.29 
1994 6.43 0.13 6.29 
1995 6.43 0.13 6.29 
1996 6.14 0.13 6.00 
1997 5.86 0.13 5.73 
1998 5.54 0.13 5.40 
1999 5.50 0.13 5.37 
2000 5.43 0.13 5.30 
2001 5.44 0.13 5.30 
2002 5.45 0.13 5.31 
2003 5.38 0.13 5.25 
2004 5.20 0.13 5.07 
2005 4.79 0.13 4.65 
2006 4.61 0.13 4.48 
2007 4.31 0.13 4.18 
2008 4.14 0.13 4.01 
2009 4.26 0.79 3.47 
2010 4.45 1.00 3.45 
2011 4.55 1.20 3.35 
2012 4.69 1.19 3.50 
2013 4.70 1.09 3.61 
2014 4.55 1.54 3.01 
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APPENDIX H:  EFFECTS OF ELIMINATING DIFFERENT INCENTIVE TYPES BY 
STATE, WITH COMPARISONS TO COSTS OF DIFFERENT INCENTIVE TYPES 
BY STATE 
 Table H1 considers the increase in net taxes to value-added ratio, averaged across the 31 
export-base industries, of eliminating different incentive types, by state, for a facility start year of 
2015. This is compared with the nominal cost of the incentive, as a ratio to value-added, for each 
incentive type and state.  
 As with the overall national numbers, for each state and incentive type, in general the 
increase in net taxes due to eliminating an incentive is not far below 100 percent of the actual 
cost of the incentive. In theory, because of limits on incentives, eliminating one incentive could 
lead to increases in other incentives, as this allows more of other incentives to be taken against 
the corporate income tax. But in the real world, it appears that usually these incentive 
interactions are of minor importance.  
 A few exceptions do occur. In Illinois, eliminating the ITC increases net taxes by about 
half of the nominal cost of the ITC. This occurs because the Illinois JCTC is very generous with 
a limited carry-forward. Eliminating the ITC allows more of the JCTC to be claimed.  
 In addition, in Arizona, eliminating the ITC actually reduces net taxes. This occurs 
because the Arizona incentive structure says that the firm can take only the lesser of either the 
ITC or the JCTC. Eliminating the ITC, on average, is assumed to allow firms to take the higher 
JCTC.  
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Table H1  Effects on Net Taxes/Value-Added Ratio by State of Eliminating Various Incentives, Compared with Incentive Nominal Cost 
PANEL A: EFFECT OF ELIMINATING INCENTIVES 










Job creation tax 
credit R&D tax credit 
National 3.31 0.38 0.06 0.19 0.63 0.13 
Alabama 2.69 0.61 0.05 1.14 0.00 0.00 
Arizona 4.15 0.00 0.16 -0.08 0.11 0.29 
California 3.91 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.39 
Colorado 3.67 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.62 0.00 
Connecticut 5.25 0.34 0.00 0.16 0.00 0.10 
District of Columbia 4.03 1.52 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Florida 3.45 0.22 0.07 0.74 0.16 0.02 
Georgia 3.52 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.41 0.09 
Illinois 4.11 0.28 0.01 0.06 0.85 0.02 
Indiana 1.86 0.63 0.02 0.55 1.19 0.17 
Iowa 3.49 1.15 0.36 0.76 0.07 0.17 
Kentucky 1.17 0.08 0.02 2.24 0.00 0.00 
Louisiana 1.92 0.77 0.16 0.05 2.10 0.21 
Maryland 4.60 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.27 
Massachusetts 4.12 0.00 0.07 0.18 0.00 0.25 
Michigan 3.49 1.27 0.21 0.00 0.52 0.00 
Minnesota 4.90 0.00 0.03 0.31 0.73 0.07 
Missouri 4.04 0.00 0.31 0.00 0.47 0.00 
Nebraska 2.26 0.00 0.17 0.87 1.29 0.08 
Nevada 2.56 0.19 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 
New Jersey 1.49 0.00 0.02 0.10 2.44 0.27 
New Mexico 4.23 1.60 0.45 0.15 1.64 0.25 
New York 1.12 0.61 0.00 0.44 2.40 0.05 
North Carolina 2.68 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.84 0.07 
Ohio 2.57 0.49 0.00 0.00 0.54 0.02 
Oregon 3.29 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.56 0.13 
Pennsylvania 4.10 1.25 0.01 0.00 0.12 0.08 
South Carolina 3.46 0.98 0.11 0.92 0.19 0.12 
Tennessee 3.40 2.46 0.05 0.03 0.24 0.00 
Texas 3.79 0.58 0.08 0.00 0.51 0.07 
Virginia 2.50 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.23 0.00 
Washington 5.06 0.02 0.07 0.02 0.00 0.00 
Wisconsin 2.88 0.00 0.17 0.58 0.64 0.12 
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PANEL B: COST OF DIFFERENT INCENTIVES      








Job creation tax 
credit R&D tax credit 
 National 0.39 0.07 0.20 0.64 0.13 
 Alabama 0.61 0.05 1.14 0.00 0.00 
 Arizona 0.00 0.16 0.21 0.39 0.29 
 California 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.39 
 Colorado 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.62 0.00 
 Connecticut 0.36 0.00 0.20 0.00 0.10 
 District of Columbia 1.67 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 Florida 0.22 0.07 0.76 0.17 0.02 
 Georgia 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.41 0.09 
 Illinois 0.29 0.01 0.12 0.91 0.02 
 Indiana 0.63 0.02 0.66 1.19 0.17 
 Iowa 1.19 0.38 0.80 0.07 0.17 
 Kentucky 0.08 0.03 2.24 0.00 0.00 
 Louisiana 0.81 0.17 0.05 2.10 0.21 
 Maryland 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.27 
 Massachusetts 0.00 0.08 0.20 0.00 0.25 
 Michigan 1.33 0.22 0.00 0.52 0.00 
 Minnesota 0.00 0.04 0.31 0.73 0.07 
 Missouri 0.00 0.32 0.00 0.47 0.00 
 Nebraska 0.00 0.18 0.99 1.29 0.08 
 Nevada 0.19 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 New Jersey 0.00 0.02 0.10 2.44 0.27 
 New Mexico 1.70 0.48 0.16 1.64 0.25 
 New York 0.63 0.00 0.44 2.40 0.05 
 North Carolina 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.84 0.07 
 Ohio 0.49 0.00 0.00 0.54 0.02 
 Oregon 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.56 0.13 
 Pennsylvania 1.34 0.01 0.00 0.12 0.08 
 South Carolina 1.00 0.11 0.94 0.22 0.12 
 Tennessee 2.59 0.05 0.03 0.24 0.00 
 Texas 0.58 0.08 0.00 0.51 0.07 
 Virginia 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.23 0.00 
 Washington 0.00 0.07 0.02 0.00 0.00 
 Wisconsin 0.00 0.18 0.00 0.64 0.12 
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PANEL C: RATIO OF EFFECT OF ELIMINATING INCENTIVE TO ITS NOMINAL COST 








Job creation tax 
credit R&D tax credit 
 National 96.6 96.2 93.1 98.6 100.0 
 Alabama 100.0 100.0 100.0   
 Arizona  97.7 -39.8 27.1 100.0 
 California  93.3   100.0 
 Colorado  99.4  100.0  
 Connecticut 95.2  82.5  100.0 
 District of Columbia 91.0     
 Florida 98.9 98.8 98.0 95.3 100.0 
 Georgia  97.6  99.5 100.0 
 Illinois 96.1 97.5 52.6 93.3 100.0 
 Indiana 99.0 98.4 83.4 100.0 100.0 
 Iowa 96.5 95.4 94.9 100.0 100.0 
 Kentucky 100.0 99.9 100.0   
 Louisiana 95.0 94.4 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 Maryland    96.4 100.0 
 Massachusetts  94.7 88.9  100.0 
 Michigan 95.7 95.7  100.0  
 Minnesota  93.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 Missouri  95.3  100.0  
 Nebraska  97.4 87.9 100.0 100.0 
 Nevada 100.0 100.0    
 New Jersey  94.1 96.5 100.0 100.0 
 New Mexico 93.9 93.9 98.1 100.0 100.0 
 New York 96.6  100.0 100.0 100.0 
 North Carolina  95.7  100.0 100.0 
 Ohio 100.0   100.0 100.0 
 Oregon    100.0 100.0 
 Pennsylvania 92.9 92.9  100.0 100.0 
 South Carolina 98.1 97.5 98.0 83.7 100.0 
 Tennessee 94.9 95.8 100.0 100.0  
 Texas 100.0 100.0  100.0 100.0 
 Virginia  95.2  100.0  
 Washington  100.0 100.0   
 Wisconsin  95.7  100.0 100.0 
NOTE: Table shows, for each incentive and state, three different calculations. The first is the increase in the present value of net taxes to the present value of value-added, averaged 
across 31 export-base industries, for a facility start year of 2015. The second is the actual cost of the incentive, measured as the present value of what is paid out divided by the 
present value of value-added, averaged across 31 export-base industries. Panel C is the ratio of the number in Panel A to the corresponding number in Panel B, expressed in 
percentage terms.  
SOURCE: Author’s calculations 
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APPENDIX I:  A NOTE ON CROSS-CHECKING RESULTS 
 One concern about this database’s model is verifying that it is implemented properly. 
These tax and incentive rules are complex. How can we verify that this database’s simulations of 
the taxes and incentives of a hypothetical firm are accurate? 
 To help verify the simulations, some of the calculations were done in two completely 
different ways, by different researchers. The reported simulations in this paper were 
implemented using a program in Stata. But some key simulations were cross-checked with the 
same simulation done using Excel, by a different researcher.  
 Specifically, for one city in each state, and for three industries, Excel simulations were 
done for two years: 1990 and 2015. The industries chosen were motor vehicles, chemicals, and 
software: three export-base industries, two in manufacturing and one in nonmanufacturing, 
including one very research-intensive industry (chemicals). The Excel simulations were 
compared with the Stata simulations. In most cases they matched exactly. In cases where they 
did not match, the Stata code logic and Excel calculations were examined until the reasons for 
any discrepancies were uncovered. Typically, these discrepancies were due either to some error 
in the Stata or Excel code or to different interpretations of some subtle feature of the tax or 
incentive rules. The discrepancies were then resolved by correcting the code and agreeing upon a 
common interpretation of the tax and incentive rules. In addition, for a few other cities and states 
and years with unusual incentive rules, the same procedure was followed, of calculating the taxes 
and incentives using both Stata and Excel, and making sure that the two different methods 
yielded the same results.  
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 In addition, the time series for incentives in each state, reported in Appendix G, were 
examined. Any large, abrupt jump in incentives or taxes, particularly if it was quickly reversed, 
was examined to make sure that the source of the jump was understood and represented a valid 
change in tax or incentive policy.  
 While it is impossible to eliminate all human error, these procedures minimize the likely 
incidence and size of errors in these database simulations.  
 
